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Ersatz Normativity or Public Law in Global
Governance: The Hard Case of International
Prescriptions for National Infrastructure Regulation
Megan Donaldson* and Benedict Kingsbury'
Abstract
Takingglobalprescriptionsfornationalinfrastructureregulationas a case study, this
Article examines the natureand implications ofthe mingling of law, governance, and economic
that is increasinglyprevalent inglobal regulatoygovernance. Itfocuses on three sets offormally
non-binding but influentialinstruments issued in the 2000s by the World Bank, the OECD,
and UNCITRAL, each of which promotesfar-reachingreforms to existing nationalpublic
law and institutions. The Article excavates these instruments' unarticulatedtheories of the
state and its roles, and theirvisions of the nature andpreferredfeaturesof law. It explores the
use by these instruments of law-like hierarchiesofnorms and their deployment of legal concepts
within a hybrid vocabulary of law, economics, andpolig' disczlines. This may amount merely

to ersatz normativity. But this Article posits that, by bringing discourses ofpublic law and
regulatoy governance into relation, instruments of this kind could open possibilitiesfor
renovation of traditionalpubclaw within the state through the opening to an indpientglohal
publiclaw. Theproductionand use of these instruments largely escapes the reach of orthodox
public and private internationallaw, and of nationalconstitutionalor administrative law.
Conceivably, global public law could transform the ways in which such prescriptions are
developed, and their invocation in particularcases, and might eventually contribute to the
reimaginationor reinvigorationofpublic law as a distinctmode of ordering. To assess whether
these arepossibilities,we take the infrastructureprovisions as a "hard case" againstwhich to
analyze two approaches to globalpublic law: "internationalpublicauthority" and 'global
administrative law." The infrastructure case illustrates signficant limits in the current
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doctrinal framings and institutional specificities of these approaches, and indicates the
importance offuture struggles among multiple dffe rentpoliticaland legalprojectsconcerning the
roles of law in global regulatoy governance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Global prescriptions for the reform of national law and institutions
increasingly blend managerial governance, often inspired by economics, with the
language and techniques of law. This blending is denounced by many public
international lawyers and scholars of transnational constitutional and
administrative law as amounting merely to an "ersatz normativity" 1 or as
corrosive of orthodox commitments to legality and values immanent in public
law.2 This Article begins by examining global prescriptions for national
infrastructure regulation as an example of this blending or hybridization of law,
governance, and economics. We trace the theories of the state and the attitudes
to law that these instruments encode, and the way in which they interweave
terms familiar from public law with languages and ideas rooted in economics and
policy disciplines. Insofar as these prescriptive instruments come to be
considered by scholars of public law, many are likely to reject the perceived
manipulation of a public law vocabulary, and its grafting on to a very specific
institutional and political project shaped primarily by economics. We frame an
alternative possibility, that instruments of the type examined, by bringing
discourses of public law and regulatory governance into relation, could prove
instead to open a path toward a more robust regime of legality. We posit that an
incipient global public law may advance this evolution, by transforming the way
in which such prescriptions are developed or invoked in particular cases, or more
broadly by contributing to the reimagination or reinvigoration of public law as a
distinct mode of ordering. This in turn may help renew the potential of public
law within states and resist the collapse of public law into, or its wholesale
instrumentalization in the service of,more diffuse notions of governance.
To explore the possibilities of such a global public law, we take global
prescriptions for national infrastructure regulation as a "hard case" against which
to analyze two approaches: "international public authority" and "global
administrative law." The infrastructure case illustrates the importance of a global
public law, but also the challenges of adapting existing framings of international
public authority and global administrative law to engage effectively with

2

See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitulionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes aboutInternational
Law and Globalization, 8 Theoret Inq L 9, 14 (2007).
Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Questfor Principles and Values, 17 Eur J Intl L 187
(2006); Alexander Somek, Administration without Sovereignoy, in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin,
eds, The Tnilight of Constitutionalism?267 (Oxford 2010). See also David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of
(Administrative)Lawin InternationalLaw, 68 L & Contemp Probs 127 (2005); Ming-Sung Kuo, InterPublicLegalioy orPost-PublicLegilimay? Global Governance and the Curious Case of GlobalAdministrative
Lawas a New Paradigm of Law, 10 IntlJ Const L 1050 (2012).
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governance that is formally non-binding and works through persuasion and
expertise.
Section 11 outlines the genesis, coverage, and form of the three sets of
instruments on which we focus our analysis, and sketches some of the ways in
which the instruments are used or invoked. The first instrument-and the one
that forms the primary subject of analysis here because of its unusual detail and
comprehensiveness-is the World Bank's Handbook for Evalualing Infrastructure
Regulator7 Systems.' The other instruments discussed are a set of prescriptive
materials on concession agreements relating to infrastructure produced in 2000
to 2003 under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and materials bearing on infrastructure policy and
regulation promulgated in 2006 and 2007 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).' All continue to be in effect despite the
turbulent reconsiderations prompted by the financial crisis that began in 2008,
the rising importance of China and other non-OECD states in foreign
infrastructure construction and financing, and the resurgence of government's
role in several significant developing economies. These instruments draw on
academic and professional knowledge of various kinds, but digest it in a form
suitable for lay audiences. They promote the sense of a general field of
infrastructure governance, while recognizing differences between sectors and
national systems. They offer models that (to varying extents) may be immediately
incorporated and applied in national systems; but none of the instruments areby themselves-comprehensive or determinative as to the course of action to be
taken by governments. Rather, they are part of structures of influence exerted by
specialist corps of consultants, experts from foreign governments and
international organizations, lobbyists, internationally connected business interests
and civil society groups, conferences and online fora, and flows of public and

3

Ashley C. Brown,Jon Stem, and Bernard Tenenbaum, with Defne Gencer, Handbookfor Evaluating
Infrastructure Regulatory Systems (World Bank 2006) (Handbook).

4

Other instruments,

not examined here, include United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, Guidelines for Infrastructure Development through Build-Operate-Transfer (B07) Projects
(UNIDO 1996) (an earlier instrument superseded in some ways by later innovations); as well as
briefer instruments, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
Core PrinciplesforaModernConcession Law (2005) (a two-page document). Infrastructure projects in
Europe may be governed by binding EU Directives on public procurement, including a proposed
directive on concessions (under discussion in the European Parliament as of February 2013).
Other advisory prescriptive materials relate to particular sectors or project types. Large volumes of
other normative materials and assessments of infrastructure and infrastructure regulation, not
considered here, are produced by specialist bodies concerned with human rights, environmental
protection, security, energy policy, and governance, etc.
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private funds.5 In this regard, they reflect the complex and multifaceted nature of
global influences on national policymaking.
Substantively, the instruments reflect an evolution in dominant
understandings of the relative roles of state and market in infrastructure
provision and essential services. The instruments are informed by the
assumption that, in light of the enormous need for investment in infrastructure,
and perceived limits on the possibility or desirability of public borrowing, private
capital will, at least in most countries, have to play a major role in future
infrastructure expansion. 6 They also, however, manifest a tempering of the
enthusiasm for rapid privatization that prevailed in many states, and in the
international financial institutions (IFIs), in the 1980s and 1990s. Shifts to greater
reliance on private sector provision have not always yielded the benefits
anticipated and are often controversial. Opposition by state politicians and local
communities has led to renationalization or tighter regulation in some countries.
Protests have also targeted international organizations such as IFIs for their roles
in construction and private provision of infrastructure, and the transnational law
that underpins infrastructure projects, including foreign investment treaties.'

There is growing scholarly interest in the role that such structures play in the "diffusion" of
particular policies and institutional configurations. Examples in English include Gregory C.
Shaffer, TransnationalLegal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge 2013); Terence C. Halliday and
Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivioy of Law: Global Norm-Making and National Law-Making in the
GlobaliZationof Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 Am J Sociol 1135 (2007); Terence C. Halliday and
Bruce G. Carruthers, Bankrupt: GlobalLawmakingandSystemic FinancialCrisis(Stanford 2009); Yves
Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, eds, Global Prescriptions:The Production, Exportation,and Importation o a

6

New Legal Orthodo.%y (Michigan 2002); Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, eds, The
InternationaliZation of Palace Wars: Lanyers, Economists,and the Contestto Transform LatinAmericanStates
(Chicago 2002); Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, eds, The Global Diffusion
ofMarkets and Democracy (Cambridge 2008); Alasdair Roberts, The Logic of Discipline:GlobalCapitasm
and the Architecture of Government 9 (Oxford 2010); Usar Rodrfguez-Garavito, Towarda Sociology of the
Global Rule of Law Field:Neoliberalism,Neoconstitutionalism,and the Contest over JudicialReform in Latin
America, in Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, eds, Layers and the Rule of Law in an Era of
Globalization 156 (Routledge 2011).
See, for example, OECD, 2 Infrastructureto 2030 25 (OECD 2007) (explaining that, in light of the
growing burdens of spending on health and aging populations, and projected diminishing tax
receipts, "public budgets ... will not suffice to bridge the infrastructure gap. What is required is
greater recourse to private sector finance, together with greater diversification of public sector
revenue sources.").
For a discussion of this contestation in the water sector, see Bronwen Morgan, Water on Tap: Rigz
and Regulation in the TransnationalGovernance of Urban Water Serices (Cambridge 2011). For activist
accounts of some of the major conflicts, see, for example, Benjamin Dangt, The Price of Fire:
Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia 55-73 (AK Press 2007) (on the "water war" in
Cochabamba); David Hall, Struggles againstPrivatizationof Electricily Worldide, in Kolya Abramsky,
ed, Sparking a WorlduideEnergy Revolution: SocialStruggles in the Transitionto a Post-PetrolWorld 188-96
(AK Press 2010) (cataloging and analyzing successful campaigns against electricity privatization).
Controversies over privatization initiatives are not confined to the developing world. There has
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High-profile failures and opposition encountered in some early privatization
initiatives, and the growing wariness of some of the major investors most active
in the waves of concession activity in the 1990s and early 2000s,' prompted the
refinement and further development of recommendations for national regulatory
reform, some of which are embodied in the instruments examined here. In
particular, the instruments reflect the rebalanced orthodoxy of the period: that
reliance on the private sector requires the creation and maintenance of a
considerable regulatory apparatus, the construction of which can be highly
challenging, particularly in the developing world. 9
Section III discusses in greater detail the nature of the prescriptions set out
in the instruments, the (often extensive and specific) legal reforms they promote,
the theory of the role of the state implicit in their recommendations, and the
general attitude to national legal systems that they encode. If followed, these
international prescriptions would have major implications for the substance of
national law in the infrastructure area, and potentially for the nature and role of
the state in infrastructure provision. These international prescriptions, necessarily
shorn of specific national context and framed for portability, typically lack the
deep foundations and institutional superstructure that long-established national
public law provides in many countries. Some of those involved in the drafting of
the instruments undoubtedly intend that infrastructure regulation escape from
some existing public law controls, and from what they regard as the excessive
and costly reach of public lawyers and legal institutions. Others may simply be
specialists in the technical elements of infrastructure and its economics and

been significant opposition to privatization conditions attached to bailout funds provided to
members of the EU, and reforms in 2012 to the UK approach to public-private partnerships for
the provision of public infrastructure. For example:
MI he Government ... recognises the concerns with [the Private Finance
Initiative] and the need for reform. There has been widespread concern that
the public sector has not been getting value for money and taxpayers have not
been getting a fair deal now and over the longer-term. There has been a lack of
transparency of the financial performance of projects and the returns made by
investors and ... the future liabilities to the taxpayer created by [Private
Finance Initiative] projects. This has led to an increasing tension in the
relationship between [Private Finance Initiative] providers, the public sector
and the wider public.
HM Treasury, A New Approach to Public Private Partnerships 5 (Dec 2012), online at
2
05112/pf2_
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/
infrastructure.new-approach-to.public-private parnerships_051212.pdf (visitedJune 13, 2013).
For examples in the water sector, see David Hall and Emanuele Lobina, The Birth, Growth and
Decline ofMultinationalWaterCompanies, in Tapio S. Katko, Petri S. Juuti, and Klaas Schwartz, eds,
Water Services Management and Governance:Lessonsfor a Sustainable Future 123, 128 (International Water
Association 2013).
9

See Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan, eds, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South:
Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies (forthcoming, Oxford 2013).
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policy, and not attuned to fundamental legal issues implicated in their
prescriptions. Assessed from a public law standpoint, the prescriptions are highly
instrumental in their orientation, and their vision of law is (in some cases at least)
a rather hollow one. They attach little weight to the specificities of existing law
and legal institutions (other than property rights), and are not attentive to the
systemic or political dimensions of law.
Section IV sets out the way in which these instruments draw on both the
vocabulary and forms of law. We argue that the instruments mingle newer
vocabularies of governance with readily recognizable terms of public law and
legality-primarily those concerned with procedural norms rather than rights or
self-government-in the service of what may be contestable legal or economic
reforms. This mingling or hybridization of vocabularies, for several decades a
feature of national practices of "new governance" in many OECD countries, is
thus carried over into transnational efforts to set out universal models for
developing countries. Hierarchies of prescriptions, from abstract to concrete,
play some role in managing the diversity of national legal systems, 0 but they also
work to give content to hybrid terms such as "legitimacy" and "transparency,"
and to transfer the connotations of these terms to particular projects of reform.
Together, these features enable processes of comparison, aggregation, and
abstraction by which certain locally specific practices and rules are translated into
universally applicable ideas, recommendations, or standards.
The hybridization we trace may have radically different effects. Over time it
may further erode the sense of any distinctive quality in law beyond its merely
instrumental usefulness in constructing particular regimes and incentives. On the
other hand, it may create a conduit for greater attention to legal structures and
dynamics. A modest form of global public law, now barely evident but already
under rudimentary construction, could over time be brought in through this
hybrid language, stiffening the current malleability of transnational managerialist
regulation, and perhaps even coming to shore up the tenuous legal framing of
"new governance" within states as well. Whether this actually occurs will depend
on a struggle between several competing political projects concerning the role of
law in global regulatory governance.
Section V explores the potential contribution of newly emerging
conceptions of global public law. Ultimately, we suggest that a future global
public law might aspire not only to order and check global influences on national

to

Insofar as the splitting of general, higher-order norms from more specific recommendations
allows for the development of global consensus while still accommodating polities for which the
specific recommendations are unsuitable. This argument is developed in Susan Block-Lieb and
Terence Halliday, Harmonization and Modernizalion in UNCIRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvenc
Law, 42 Tex Intl UJ 475, 477-80 (2007).
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policy, but to generate more robust legality in approaches to national, hybrid,
and private regulation, fostering a more nuanced and holistic approach not only
to law and legality in prescriptions for reform, but also in the mindset and work
of the consultants, experts, and national officials shaping future regulatory
structures. Against the backdrop of these aspirations, we use the infrastructure
case to assess the possible contributions of international public authority and
global administrative law. Work under these banners seeks, in somewhat
different ways, to identify in practice, or to craft, new visions of global public law
adequate to capture governance of the kind reflected in the infrastructure
instruments. Consideration of the infrastructure case brings to light some limits
inherent in the current doctrinal framings and institutional specificities of these
approaches. In relation to global administrative law, the infrastructure case
points to critical questions regarding the persons or entities whose practice
shapes the development of a global administrative law, the hybrid vocabulary in
which global administrative law itself is framed, and the methodologies of
comparison or translation, abstraction and specification, by which broad
principles are translated into specific institutional requirements.

II. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT WITH NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
POLICY AND REGULATION
Infrastructure transactions with regulatory implications are typically entered
into by national or sub-national governments, but government contractual
arrangements and national constitutional and legal provisions concerning
infrastructure operate within an increasingly dense web of transnational legal
norms. These range from, for example, obligations undertaken pursuant to the
WTO agreements to liberalize services trade in particular sectors, to bilateral
investment treaties and the customary law concerning treatment of foreign
investors, to obligations in loan agreements with multilateral development banks
(MDBs). International organizations may be involved as lenders, 1 political risk
insurers, 2 or fora for dispute settlement, 3 as well as sources of "technical
11 For example, the MDBs or, in more limited ways, the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

12

13

Typically, lending by the MDBs conditional on elements of privatization has been applicable
primarily to developing countries, but in Europe the "troika" of the European Commission, IMF
and European Central Bank are pressing for privatization of water companies in Greece and
Portugal as acondition of bailout funds: see the exchange of correspondence between civil society
groups and the European Commission (May-October 2013), online at http://www.tri.org/
article/ec-stop-imposing-privatisation-water (visited May 18, 2013).
For example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), part of the World Bank
Group.
For example, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)-also part
of the World Bank Group-and arbitral panels operating under its auspices.

Vol 14 No. 1

ErsatZ Normativity: NationalInfrastructureRegulation

Donaldson and Kingsbugy

assistance" and expert advice on creating a domestic legal and institutional
environment conducive to foreign investment-the facet of their activity
emphasized here.14

In what follows, we give a brief overview of three sets of prescriptive
material produced by or under the auspices of international organizations,

concerning various aspects of infrastructure provision and governance of the
infrastructure sector. The World Bank's Handbook for Evalualing Infrastructure
Regulatory 3jystems focuses on the design and function of regulatory agencies.

UNCJTRAL's materials focus on the legal framework for, and process of
entering into, concession agreements. The OECD instruments, insofar as they

deal specifically with infrastructure, address policymaking at a more general level.
For each set of instruments, we give basic indications of the forms of the
instruments, their institutional background, their mode of creation, and instances
in which they have been invoked. The forms of the instruments are important
for understanding the nature of their engagement with national public law and

their use of a vocabulary affiliated with public law (further explored in Sections
HI and IV). The way in which these instruments were created, and have been
invoked, becomes relevant when we turn in Section V to the question of

whether their generation, promulgation, and application are subject to any body
of public law.

A. The World Bank's Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure
Regulatory SJstems
From the 1990s the World Bank shifted from predominantly "bricks and
mortar" projects to a greater emphasis on developing the national regulatory
environment necessary to attract foreign investment to infrastructure sectors. 15
However, some regulators did not develop the capacities and independence the
World Bank thought they needed; consumers and citizens were, in some cases,
violently opposed to commercialization and privatization projects; and total
14

15

Among other institutional engagements discussed further below, see UNCTAD, Services,
Development and Trade: The Regulator and InstitutionalDimension of InfrastructureServices (UN 2012);
UNCTAD Secretariat, PromotingInvestmentfor Development: Best Practices in StrengtheningInvestment in
Basic InfrastructureinDeveloping Countries:A Summag of UNCTAD's Research on.FDI in Infrastructure,
TD/B/C.J1/I 2 (Feb 10, 2011), online at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ciidl 2_en.pdf (visited May
18, 2013). Global influences may also be brought to bear on particular transactions by the
corporate entities or groups involved in infrastructure projects. These entities are often large,
multinational enterprises, and transactions may be supported by lawyers, advisers, consultants, or
insurers themselves operating globally and drawing on experience gleaned from analogous
transactions in different jurisdictions.
See WorldBank, InfrastructureAction Plan 2 (2003), online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTTRM/Resources/InfrastructureActionPlan.pdf (visited May 18, 2013).
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investment in infrastructure fell.' 6 Although the World Bank increasingly faces
competition from other lenders in the area of infrastructure," it remains an
important source of expertise concerning regulatory and institutional design.18
The Handbook had its origins in one element of the bank's 2003 Infrastructure
Action Plan: the development of standardized "diagnostic assessments" of
investment, institutional and policy frameworks in the infrastructure sectors of
different countries.' 9

The Handbook was authored by four regulatory specialists, two holding
primarily academic positions but with long experience as consultants or advisers
on regulatory matters to various countries and agencies, including the World
Bank, and two individuals then holding posts within the bank. It is a highly
sophisticated book-length "road map" for evaluation of both governance in, and
performance of, existing regulatory systems. 2' It sets out a comprehensive vision,
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, of the nature, purpose, and design of
national regulation itself, and of the proper arrangement of the polity and
economy, in sectors such as electricity, water, and telecommunications,
endorsing a model of independent regulatory agencies overseeing privatized, or
at least commercialized, service provision.
The Handbook's vision of regulation is highly systematized. At the peak are
three "meta-principles" which must be satisfied by any regulatory system if it is
to be sustainable. These are connected to a list of "principles," and to more
concrete "standards," that implement the "meta-principles" in the context of an
independent regulator. Taken together, the standards provide a detailed and farreaching scheme, full compliance with which may necessitate significant changes
to applicable laws and institutional arrangements in many developing-and

16

17

Handbook at 13-14 (cited in note 3). See also Jon Stern, The Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies, in
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, eds, Tbe Oxford Handbook of Regulation 223
(Oxford 2010).
Chinese banks are providing significant funds for infrastructure projects, particularly in Africa,

19

and there are ongoing discussions about the formation of a new development bank, controlled by
the emerging "BRICS" powers, with a focus on addressing infrastructure needs.
On the bank as a repository of knowledge and a research institution in general, see, for example,
Nicolas Stern with Francisco Ferreira, The World Bank as 'TntellectualActor,"in Devesh Kapur, John
P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds, 2 The World Bank.- Its FirstHalf-Century 523 (Brookings 1997);
Elisa van Waeyenberge and Ben Fine, A Knowledge Bank?, in Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine, and Elisa van
Waeyenberge, eds, The PoliticalEconomyof Development: The World Bank, Neoliberalismand Development
Research 26 (Pluto 201 1);Jonathan Morduch, The Knowledge Bank, in William Easterly, ed, ReinventirE
ForeignAid 377 (MIT 2008).
Handbook at 14 n 5 (cited in note 3). Although examples and analysis in the Handbook are drawn

20

primarily from the electricity sector, the authors suggest that most of the Handbook is applicable to
the regulation of other infrastructure as well. Id at 23.
Id at xii.

18
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indeed developed-countries. In this hierarchy of "meta-principles,"
"principles," and "standards," the Handbook deftly invokes abstract concepts
such as "transparency" and "accountability" that draw on languages of legality,
rule of law, and public law, as well as discourses of "good governance."
Outlining techniques by which experts can increase the influence of their
recommendations within states, the Handbook is also explicitly designed as a tool
for diffusion of the regulatory policy it embraces. It sets out detailed
methodologies for three kinds of evaluation (short, mid-level, and in-depth),
involving different degrees of inquiry into actual practices of regulation, and the
merits or otherwise of substantive decisions made. Evaluations are likely to be a
condition of, or part of the process of project design for, a loan from an MDB
or aid agency, and evaluators are typically World Bank staff, counterparts in
other similar institutions, consultants, or experts from policy research institutes.2'
The Handbook embraces the central role played by experts in certain fields as
vectors of policy and as ongoing advisers.' Evaluators are encouraged to be
persuasive advocates of the approved regulatory model, presenting "steppingstones that can move a country from a starting point of no formal regulatory
system to a best-practice regulatory system,"' and drawing on techniques of
benchmarking and comparison. Quantitative rankings or "indicators" are used in
the Handbook to simplify information about complex social phenomena,24
manage the diversity of regulatory contexts across jurisdictions, and spur
competitive inclinations that promote reform. Once an evaluation is complete,
for example, the Handbook suggests that evaluators "present, at least initially, the
"big picture" in a single overall governance ranking," as "[a] policymaker is much
more likely to pay attention if he sees a single number that shows that his
country's electricity regulatory commission ranks five out of six in his region
25
rather than numerous tables filled with raw data that are hard to grasp.

21

22
23
24

25

Id at 168-69. For "in-depth" investigations, the Handbook recommends a team of three, including
an international expert "experienced in both regulatory and sectoral matters in both his or her
own country, as well as in other countries and cultures [and ideally having] advanced academic
credentials in relevant disciplines (for example, law, economics, engineering, and/or accounting),"
a local expert that has similar credentials and is well connected and respected in the domestic
regulatory system, and a local lawyer. Id at 304-05.
See, for example, id at 106-08, 217, 228-29.
Handbook at 79 (cited in note 3).
See, for example, Handbook at 83-88 (cited in note 3). See also Kevin E. Davis, Benedict
Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, Indicatorsas a Technoogy of GlobalGovernance, 46 L & Socy Rev 71,
71-72 (2012).
Handbook at 32 (cited in note 3).
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B. UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide and Model Legislative
Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects
UNCITRAL, a UN commission with a membership of 60 states,2 6 was
established in 1966 with a mandate to further the progressive harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade. It has historically relied pimaily on
conventions and model laws as instruments, but has broadened its repertoire
into new "legal technologies" such as "legislative guides," the greater flexibility
of which have arguably allowed it to be more ambitious in its law reform
proposals, to accommodate dissent and national particularity, and to include
more detailed background material for the guidance of national legislators.2 '
Following work by the Secretariat in 1994 to 1996 on "build-operatetransfer" projects, 2 UNCITRAL decided to proceed with the drafting of a
legislative guide on privately financed infrastructure. Discussions in the UN
Sixth Committee indicate widespread support for this work from states, and
particularly from developing countries.29 The guide was developed by the
Secretariat with the assistance of experts, rather than, as had been the case with
other UNCITRAL projects, by a working group reflecting the Commission's
membership.' °
26

These states represent different geographical regions, and they reflect the principal economic and

27

legal systems of the world from both developed and developing countries. Members are elected to
six-year terms by the General Assembly. General Assembly Res No 2205 (XXI), UN Doc
A/RES/2205(XXI) (1966); General Assembly Res No 57/20, UN Doc A/RES/57/20 (2002).
UNCITRAL, A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic Factsabout the United Nations Commission on International

28

http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
2013),
online
at
Law
13-18
(UN
Trade
english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf (visited May 18, 2013). On the
possible tensions between unification, harmonization, and modernization in UNCITRAL's work,
see Block-Lieb and Halliday, 42 Tex Intl L J at 477-80 (cited in note 10). On the relationship
between incrementalism and legitimacy in the work of UNCITRAL, see Susan Block-Lieb and
Terence C. Halliday, Incrementa/ismsin GlobalLaw-Making, 32 BrookJ Intl L 851 (2007); Terence C.
Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb, and Bruce G. Carruthers, RhetoricalLegitimation:GlobalScriptsas Stratgc
Devices ofInternational Organizations, 8 Socio-Econ Rev 77 (2010).
See Build-Operate-Transfer Projects: Note by the Secretariat, 27 YB UNCITRAL 207, UN Doc

29

A/CN.9/424, UN Sales No E.98.V.7 (1996).
See UN GAOR 6th Comm, 51st Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/51/SR.3 (1996); UN GAOR 6th
Comm, 51 st Sess, 4th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/51/SR.4 (1996);UN GAOR 6th Comm, 52d Sess, 3d
mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/52/SR.3 (1997); UN GAOR 6th Comm, 52d Sess, 4th mtg, UN Doc
A/C.6/52/SR.4 (1997).

30

Some were critical of the reliance on expert advisers. See, for example, Don Wallace Jr.,
UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on PrivatelyFinancedInfrastructure:Achievement and Prospects,8 Tul J
Intl & Comp L 283,286 (2000) (observingthat this meant that there was not "as rich an exchange
among representatives of different legal systems and traditions as there could have been"). Others,
including representatives of the UK, welcomed the decision not to establish a formal working
group. See UN GAOR 6th Comm, 52d Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/52/SR.3 at 6 (1997).
Malaysia proposed establishing a working group to complete work on the Legislative Guide; Kenya
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In 2000, UNCITRAL adopted the resulting Legislative Guide on Privatey
FinancedInfrastructureProjects.3 The Legislative Guide comprises a series of relatively
high-level "legislative recommendations, 3 2 covering everything from the general
legislative and institutional framework for privately financed infrastructure to
selection of concessionaires, the contents of the project agreement, the duration,
extension, and termination of the agreement, and dispute settlement, followed by
some 200 pages of "notes" described as providing an "analytical introduction"
and "background information to enhance understanding of the legislative
recommendations. ",33
Some states had proposed the development of actual model legislative
provisions dealing with the matters covered in the Legislative Guide. Although
there was some controversy over the desirability of such an undertaking,' a
working group of UNCITRAL member states proceeded and, in 2003,
UNCITRAL adopted a set of Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed

31

took the opposite view, arguing that "the level of interest in the topic and the limited expertise
available from developing countries were such that the discussions should not be entrusted to a
workinggroup." Id at 6; UN GAOR 6th Comm, 52d Sess, 4th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/53/SR.4 at 7
(1998).
UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Privatey FinancedInfrastructureProjects, UN Doc A. CN.9/SER.B/4

32

(2001) (Legislative Guide).
Id at xii.

33
34

Id at xi.
The "Rio Group" called for model legislative provisions in 1998, and Belarus supported this: UN
GAOR 6th Comm, 53d Sess, 4th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/53/SR.4 at 2,8 (1998). Austria supported
the discussion of preparation of a model law, if a large number of states, particularly developing
states, would benefit from it: UN GAOR 6th Comm, 55th Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR3
at 6 (2000). India and Japan suggested waiting to see how the Legislative Guide performed before
attempting a model law, while Indonesia and Kenya favored the holding of a colloquium to
discuss the possibility: UN GAOR 6th Comm, 55th Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.3 at 8,
10-11 (2000); 4th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.4 at 2 (2000). The UK expressed skepticism about
the desirability or feasibility of a model law "without proof of substantial support from potential
user countries": UN GAOR 6th Comm, 55th Sess, 4th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.4 at 2 (2000).
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Ukraine all expressed a preference for remaining with the
flexible mode of the model law, rather than drafting model legislative provisions: UN GAOR 6th
Comm, 53d Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/53/SR.3 at 7 (1998); UNGAOR 6th Comm, 54th Sess,
3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.3 at 10 (1999); UNGAOR 6th Comm, 53d Sess, 4th mtg, UN
Doc A/C.6/53/SR.4 at 7-8 (1998). To assist UNCITRAL to reach an informed view on whether
or not to proceed with the drafting of model provisions, the Secretariat, together with the PublicPrivate Infrastructure Advisory Facility, a multi-donor facility under the aegis of the World Bank,
organized a colloquium attended by some 70 government officials, bankers, lawyers,
representatives of international organizations and in particular international financial institutions,
as well as business-oriented NGOs. At that event, too, views were divided on the desirability or
feasibility of development of model provisions: Possible Future Work on Privately Financed
InfrastructureProjects, Note by the Secretariat,UN Doc A/CN.9/488 at 4-5 (July 5, 2001).
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Infrastructure Projects.3 The Model Provisions translate recommendations on the
more specific aspects of the Legislative Guide (from selection of concessionaires to
dispute settlement) into template legislative provisions, many of which simply set
out matters to be stipulated in the concession contract. While the ModelProvisions
do not entirely overlap with the Legislative Guide, they are "to be understood and
applied in the light and with the assistance of the explanatory notes contained in
the Guide."36
UNCITRAL is contemplating an expansion of its work on privately
financed infrastructure. A 2012 note from the Secretariat suggested that this
work might encompass: harmonization of the Legislative Guide with work on
procurement; identification of other topics that should be addressed in a modem
text on privately financed infrastructure projects, such as promotion of domestic
rather than international dispute resolution mechanisms; and broadening the
scope of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions to cover public-private
partnerships (PPPs) beyond the infrastructure sector, in areas such as natural
resources and private provision of services.37 UNCITRAL agreed to the first of
these areas of work, and opted to explore the possibility of pursuing the latter
two. A colloquium was held in May 2013 to examine the issue and the resulting
report will be considered by UNCITRAL in July 2013.38
C. OECD Advisory Material on Investment,
Policy, and Infrastructure

Regulatory

The OECD's economic and social policy work spans its (now) 34 member
countries and varying constellations of non-members. The OECD produces
some conventions and binding "decisions," 3 9 but many more formally nonMuch of the
binding "declarations,". "recommendations," or "guidelines.'

UNCITRAL, Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, UN Sales No
E.04.V.11 (2004) (Model Provisions).
on the Work of its Fifth Session, UN
36
Reportof the Working Groupon PrivatelyFinancedlnfrastructureProiects
Doc A/CN.9/521 at 5 (Sept 26, 2002).
37 Procurement and Infrastructure Development: Possible Future Work, Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc
A/CN.9/755 (June 11, 2012).
38
Report of the United Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law, UN GAOR, 67th Sess, UN Doc
A/67/17 at 28-29 (2012). For identification of various factors to be considered in relation to
whether to pursue further work on PPPs, see UNCITRAL, InternationalColloquium on Public-Private
Partnerships:Discussion Paper, UN Doc A/CN.9/782 (Apr 22, 2013).
39 "Decisions" are, unless otherwise provided, binding on all OECD members. Convention on the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1960), Art 5(a), 8888 UN Treaty Ser
179 (1960).
40 "Recommendations" are submitted to members in order that the members may implement them,
if they consider it opportune. Id at Art 5(b). There is no provision in the OECD Convention for
35
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OECD's influence works through structures of peer review, surveillance, and
policy dialogue informed by these non-binding instruments.4'
The OECD's engagement with infrastructure and infrastructure regulation
lies at the intersection of a number of different initiatives on investment,
concessions, and regulatory policy, as well as infrastructure more specifically. We
here consider primarily those instruments dealing most directly with
infrastructure and infrastructure regulation: the 2006 Poliff Framework for
Investment (PF) and associated materials,42 and the 2007 PriniplesforPrivateSector
Paridpalionin Infrastructure.43
The PI is the most recent iteration of the OECD's investment policy
agenda and has been described as the OECD's "most serious surveillance effort
[on liberalization] to date."" It covers areas from investment to trade,
competition, tax, human resource development, public governance, and
infrastructure, including the "investment climate" for private investment in
infrastructure provision. It is structured as a series of questions about whether
the government in question has taken particular steps intended to improve the
climate for investment, together with "annotations" that explain the importance
of each of the steps mooted in the questions, and specify options and additional

41

42

43

44

"declarations" or "guidelines," but at least the former, while not legally binding, are noted by the
OECD Council, and their application is monitored by relevant bodies within the OECD. See
OECD Legal Instruments, http://www.oecd.org/legal/oecdlegalinstruments-theacts.htm (visited
May 18, 2013).
On the OECD's mode of work, see Tony Porter and Michael Webb, Role of the OECD in the
Orchestrationof Global Knowledge Networks, in Rianne McBride and Stephen Mahon, eds, The OECD
and Transnational Governance 43 (UBC 2008); Richard Woodward, The OECD and Economic
Governance:Invisibiliy andImpotence, in Kerstin Martens and Anja P. Jakobi, eds, Mechanisms of OECD
Governance: International lncentivesfor National Policy-Making? 54, 70 (Oxford 2010).
OECD, Policy Frameworkfor Investment (OECD 2006) (PF). On the OECD's work on investment
(among other things), see Robert T. Kudrle, Governing Economic GlobaliZation: The Pioneering
Experience of the OECD,46J World Trade 695 (2012); Russell Alan Williams, The OECD andForeig
Investment Rules: The Global Promotion of Liberali.ation, in McBride and Mahon, eds, OECD and
TransnationalGovernance 117, 118 (cited in note 41) (arguing that while the OECD is supposedly
member-driven, the OECD's work on investment has been oriented to the promotion of
particular perspectives-those of "economists committed to an organizational discourse of
(neo)liberal economics").
OECD PrinciplesforPrivateSectorParticipationin Infrastructure (OECD 2007) (Private SectorParticipation
Principles). These Principles have the status of a "recommendation" (see note 40). Other OECD
material dealing less directly with infrastructure includes the GeneralPrinciplesfor RegulatoryQualioy
(2005) and Recommendation on Regulatoy Policy and Governance (2012), online at
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf (visited May 18, 2013). More
specifically on the concessions point, the OECD has prepared Basic Elements of a Law on Concession
Agreements (1999-2000), although this document is no longer featured prominently on the OECD
website, and may have been superseded to some extent by subsequent work in UNCITRAL.
Williams, The OECD and ForeignInvestment Rules at 129 (cited in note 42).
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resources. The PFH is accompanied by a book of "good practices"4 and by a
"PFI Toolkit" providing further explanation and references.46 The OECD
asserts that the PF1 was developed by a task force of national representatives
from some 60 countries, together with representatives of various business, labor,
and civil society organizations, and major international organizations including
the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)4" (although a joint letter to the OECD signed by some 53 NGOs
rejected any suggestion that the consultation period meant that the PH had been
developed "in cooperation with civil society," as the OECD had reportedly
claimed).48 The PF is now used in OECD reviews of the investment policy of
states,49 although more as a checklist to ground the survey of state performance
than as a rigid framework against which states are assessed.' It has been taken
up as a basis for work on business-climate development strategies under the
auspices of the MENA-OECD investment program, and for the conduct of
investment policy reviews under the NEPAD-OECD Africa and ASEANOECD investment initiatives.5 '
The PrivateSector ParficipalionPriniples emerged from a large-scale study on
"Infrastructure to 2030," conducted in 2005 to 2007.52 The Prindples are worded

45

OECD, Policy FrameworkforInvestment: A Review of Good Practices (OECD 2006) (PFI Review of Good
Practices).

(visited May 18, 2013).

46

OECD, PFI Toolkit, online at http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/

47

For further details on consultations and contributing organizations, see PFI at 4 (cited in note 42).
OECD Watch Co-ordinatedNGO Submission, in OECD, A Policy Frameworkfor Investment: Responses

48

Received in Public Consultation 61 (Feb 22, 2006), online at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
inv/investmentfordevelopment/36199688.pdf (visited May 18, 2013) (PFI Public Responses
Compilation).
49

These reviews are published by the OECD Investment Committee, following consultation with
country officials. The OECD indicates that "[p]riority countries for review are those showing
potential for adherence to the OECD investment instruments," being the OECD Codes of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements and Current Invisible Operations [in other words, servicesi
[originally promulgated in 1961 and 1960 respectively, but periodically updated]; the Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises and its four components (on
Guidelines for MNEs, National Treatment, conflicting requirements for MNEs, and international
investment incentives and disincentives); and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions. See OECD Investment Policy Reviews, online
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/countryreviews.htm (visited May 18, 2013).

50

si

For examples, see OECD Investment Policy Reviews Indonesia (OECD 2010); OECD
Investment Policy Reviews Colombia (OECD 2012); OECD Investment Policy Reviews Tunisia
(OECD 2012).
OECD, The Policy Frameworkfor Investment (PF1), http://www.oecd.org/investment/pfi.htm

52

(visited May 18, 2013).
See, for example, OECD, Infrastructureto 2030: Telecom, Land'1ransport,Water andElectricity(OECD
2006).
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in very general terms, and each is accompanied by some further discussion.
Thus, Principle 5 ("A sound enabling environment for infrastructure investment,
which implies high standards of public and corporate governance, transparency
and the rule of law, including protection of property and contractual rights, is
essential to attract the participation of the private sector") is elaborated with,
inter alia, a cross reference to the PFI,and the comment that "[s]uccess depends
on a wide range of legislation and administrative practices bearing on private
companies, their employees and other stakeholders, and the ability of local
suppliers and subcontractors to partner with infrastructure providers." 53 The
Private Sector PartipationPrinciples are stated to have been developed "under the
aegis of the Investment Committee... in co-operation with other OECD bodies
and through a process of consultations with a broad group of public and private
sector experts from OECD and non-OECD countries, as well as from nongovernmental organisations," and are intended "to be used for government
assessment, action plans and reporting, international co-operation and publicprivate dialogue," in conjunction with the PFIand other OECD instruments.'
D. The Role of Transnational Instruments in National
Policymaking
It is difficult to gauge the actual effects of instruments such as those
examined here in the wider landscape of transnational governance and of
national decisionmaking. Although some of the prescriptions overlap with what
might be binding obligations under, for example, international investment law,
none of the instruments considered here are binding and, given their form and
the mode of their drafting, it seems difficult to locate them even within a
netherworld of "soft law." 5 They work primarily through rhetorical persuasion
and appeals to expertise, and even under the best conditions it is difficult
accurately to assess the individual impact of such interventions. 56 It is entirely

53
54

Private Sector ParticipationPrinciplesat 15 (cited in note 43).
Id at 3, 11. See also OECD Principlesfor the Public Governance of Public-Private Partnerships(OECD
2012).

55 The Legislative GuideandModel Provisions are the subject of a UN General Assembly resolution, but
the resolution merely recommends that all states "give due consideration to" these instruments
"when revising or adopting legislation related to private participation in the development and
operation of public infrastructure." General Assembly Res No 58/76, UN Doc A/RES/58/76 at
2 (2003).
56
For example, Kudrle concludes that policy diffusion within OECD membership is difficult to
ascribe to actions of the OECD alone, such as the OECD's support of liberalization efforts,
facilitation of peer review (albeit primarily of new members or outside states adhering to the
OECD's 1976 Declarationon InternationalInvestment and MulinationalEnterprises) and production of
high-quality research and data. Kudrle, GoverningEconomic GlobaliZationat 710-11 (cited in note 42).
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possible that the instruments surveyed here do not, by themselves, have any
discernible effect distinct from the effects of other institutions' material,
international legal norms, conditionalities imposed by one of the MDBs, or
broader influences of global capital flows. However, given that the institutions
involved in adopting or promoting these instruments (or the national delegates
involved in decisionmaking) have an interest in infrastructure, and a range of
means by which they might further this agenda, it seems reasonable to assume
that the institutions and/or national delegates at least expect the instruments
which they have chosen to use to have some impact.
These instruments can bear on national policymakers in different ways.
Where the drafting is collaborative, the process of drafting itself might play a
role in educating officials or shifting them toward a particular view. Officials
might simply read and consider the instruments in the process of national
policymaking, or cite them in national debates. The extent of the comments by
NGOs and the OECD Business and Infrastructure Advisory Committee on
specific textual features of the PFI, for example, indicates that at least some
groups thought the detail of the whole text mattered. 7
The instruments may also be adopted as part of an agenda for specific
evaluation and reform projects. The Handbook is described by experts as the
"'gold standard' for assessing the effectiveness of infrastructure regulatory
systems," 8 and now features in the World Bank's "PPP in Infrastructure
Resource Center," 9 and in the "Body of Knowledge" on infrastructure
regulation.6" It is specifically designed to provide a benchmark for evaluations
that might themselves have a great influence, especially if conducted as part of
preparation of a loan, or provision of technical assistance. It has been used to

Williams agrees that it is difficult to measure the impact of the OECD's work on liberalization,
Williams, OECD and.ForeignInvestment Rules at 132 (cited in note 42). For a skeptical view of the
OECD's impact overall, see Woodward, OECD and Economic Governance (cited in note 41) (arguing
that "the OECD's greatest contribution to economic governance is not shaping national
economic policies but, through constructing communities of influence, the less tangible altering of
the mindset of those involved in economic management and the ideas underpinning it.").
57
58

59

60

See note 71 below.
Sanford Berg, Characterizing the Efficienc and Effectiveness of Regulatogy Institutions, in UNCTAD,
Services, Development and Trade: The Regulatory andInstitutionalDimension of Infrastructur Services 112, 114
(UN 2012).
See World Bank, PPP in Infrastructure Resource Center, Energy Law and Regulation, online at
(visited
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/sector/energy/laws-regulations
May 18, 2013).
Developed by the Public Utility Research Center at the University of Florida, in collaboration with
institutions including the World Bank. See Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulation, Annotated
Reading List for Regulatory Process, online at http://regulationbodyofknowledge.org/
regulatory-process/references/ (visited May 18, 2013).
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carry out evaluations leading to regulatory reform in Jamaica,6 1 and is cited in the
policy and academic literature on regulatory design and evaluation.62
Although there is no definitive survey of the influence of the Legislative
Guide and Model Provisions,63 they are referred to by various international
organizations and are, in particular, taken as one of the principal international
standards against which country legislation is assessed in the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development's (ERBD) "Concessions Assessments"' and
"Country Law Assessments."65 Assessments undertaken in 2011 indicate that
Albania and Lithuania, in particular, have concessions laws very close to the
contents of the Legislative Guide.66
61

Stern, Evaluation of RegulatoyAgencies (cited in note 16).

62

See, for example, Darryl S.L. Jarvis and Benjamin K. Sovacool, Conceptualizjngand Evaluating Best

63

Practicesin Electricity and Water Regulatory Governance, 36 Ener 4340, 4351 n 14 (2011).
UNCITRAL monitors the status of its conventions and the adoption by states of legislation based

64

on its model laws, but this monitoring does not extend to other texts, including legislative guides,
"whose impact this method cannot easily assess." Status of Conventions and Vodel Laws, Note by the
Secretariat,UN Doc A/CN.9/751 at 1 (May 2, 2012).
See EBRD, Concessions Assessments, online at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/legal/

65

concessions/assessments.shtml (visited May 18, 2013). For a compilation of methodology and
country-by-country results, see EBRD, Concession / PPPLaws Assessment 2011: FinalReport (May
2012), online at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/concessions/pppreport.pdf(visited May
18, 2013).
These assessments are defined by the EBRD as a "means of judging the progress made by a single

66

country in making its commercial law internationally acceptable." EBRD, County Law Assessments,
online at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/legal/cla.shtml (visited May 18, 2013) (emphasis
added). These country law assessments in turn draw on earlier "concessions sector assessments."
See, for example, EBRD, Office of the General Counsel, CommercialLaws of Poland auly 2010): An
Assessment by the EBRD *6, online at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/sector/legal/poland.pdf
(visited May 18, 2013). The EBRD was an active participant in development and implementation
of the Legislative Guide and Model Provisions. Jos6 Angelo Estrella Faria, The Relationship between
FormulatingAgenciesin InternationalLegal Harmonization:Competition, Cooperatin,or PeacefulCoexistence?
A Few Remarks on the Experience of UNC1IRAL, 51 Loy L Rev 253, 276-77 (2005).
EBRD, Concession! PPP Laws Assessment 2011 at *18, 36 (cited in note 64). It seems that the
Legislative Guide was used as one source of guidance for the drafting of the Lithuanian law: see
Christopher Clement-Davies, Gledrius Stasevicus, and Alexei Zverev, Laying the FoundationStone:
Lithuania'sNew ConcessionsLawandItsLessonsfor PPPs, 32 Intl Bus Law 267,270 (2004) (describing
a process whereby the Lithuanian Ministry of Economy approached the EBRD with a request to
review its existing concessions law; the EBRD put the assignment of reviewing the existing law
and drafting a new one out to tender, and awarded the tender to a team comprising an
international law firm and a Lithuanian law firm; and this team drafted an initial version of the
new law, drawingon the Legislative Guide (along with EU requirements and recommendations, the
draft OECD "Basic Elements of a Law on Concession Agreements," and local procurement,
construction, investment protection, contract and other laws)). However, there are indications that
the reforms pursued in Lithuania are not yet widespread. A 2012 review of the EBRD's Legal
Transition Programme, which had been involved in the drafting of the UNCITRALI Legislative
Guide and Model Provisions, found that the legal environment in emerging and transition economies
in Europe had scope for improvement, and that this improvement may be a slow process.
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The Private Sector ParidpationPrinples are referred to by several of the
MDBs. They have also been used by the OECD as the basis for a further OECD
ChecklistforPublicAclion on PrivateSectorParticipationin Water Infrastructure,intended
as more practical guidance for states, and used as the basis for assessments of
framework conditions for private sector participation in various countries.67
It may be the existence of an ensemble of similarly oriented instruments that
exercises influence, whether because the instruments validate each other,68 or
because the multiplicity of such instruments reinforces the sense of an
independent field of infrastructure policy which must be considered from the
starting point of encouraging private investment, rather than from some
alternative imperative (such as social justice, human rights, or national
sovereignty over resources). Transnational governance of infrastructure of the
kind reflected in the instruments works alongside other global legal regimes
which assume, or seek to realize, particular features of domestic public law:
interventions in the areas of democratization and rule of law also aim at
fundamental reorganizations of domestic political and legal systems, while
international and regional human rights law has its own vision of domestic
public law as a system for the recognition and vindication of rights.69 Although
there are, in the instruments, muffled echoes of these potentially divergent
programs, the instruments as a whole manage to seal themselves off from this
broader universe. The PFI, for example, was drafted in the wake of backlash
against attempts to negotiate a binding Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MA1, and the attempt to involve civil society in the PFImay have stemmed in
part from the MAI experience,7 but there is little reflection of this controversy

67

T. Bartos, et al, SpecialStudy: I-egalTransition ProgrammeReview *7, 13, Annex 3 (University of Hong
Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No 2012/040, Nov 2012), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2181251 (visited May 18, 2013).
For the Checklist and reports of national assessments to date, see OECD, Private Sector Participation

69

in the Water and Sanitation Sector, online at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentpolicy/water.htm (visited May 18, 2013).
In some cases the instruments refer directly to each other. The PFI, for example, mentions as
"additional resources," under the treatment of infrastructure -related questions, the website of the
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisor' Facility (PPIAF) (featuring the Handbook) and the
UNCITRAL Model Provisions. PF1 at 65 (cited in note 42). See also Private Sector Participation
Principlesat 30 (cited in note 43). Interestingly, the more specific Handbook does not refer to either
OECD or UNCITRAL materials. The invocation of a similar vocabulary across the instruments,
albeit with minor differences in definition or specification, may itself generate a sense of
consensus even in the absence of specific cross-references.
A human rights approach may have specific implications for the regulation of infrastructure, for

70

example, in demands that privatization or regulatory reform be structured to protect particularly
vulnerable populations. On the interplay between human rights and the ways in which these rights
translate to particular demands for regulation, see Morgan, Water on Tap at 24-27 (cited in note 7).
Kudrle, Governing Economic Globalization at 707-10 (cited in note 42).
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in the text itself. The PFIisdrafted at one remove from positive law. Although it
makes frequent reference to investment agreements and the international law
concerning expropriation, for example, it does not delve into international
investment jurisprudence, and this distancing allows the PFI to selectively
incorporate references to human rights law, for example, without making clear
possible tensions between states' obligations to protect human rights and
investor rights. 7 The very familiarity of the normative prescriptions contained in
these texts is indicative of the effects of the governance of which they are a part:
the generalization, naturalization, and diffusion of a "common sense" of the way
to handle this aspect of public policy, and of the role of law in this domain.

III. INFRASTRUCTURE, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC LAW
We turn now to examine the various prescriptions for national public law
contained in the instruments. We look first at their general characterization of
the appropriate role of the state in infrastructure provision (Section I.A). We
then try to give some sense of the particular, sometimes far-reaching, reforms to
systems of national law contained in these instruments, and the attitude to law in
general encoded by them (Section IiI.B). On our reading, the treatment of the
state is connected to the detailed recommendations for legal reforms. It is selfevident that the greater involvement of private actors requires major institutional
and legal change. However, we also argue that the instruments' approach to the
state as an actor, and their emphasis on "balancing" the various interests
involved in infrastructure, influences the orientation of the instruments more
generally and the way they approach the definition of abstract terms such as
"legitimacy" and "transparency." The connection of these terms with particular
prescriptions for reform is taken up in Section IV below.
71

On the conflict between neoliberal and rights-based framings of water service provision, and their
interactions, see Morgan, Water on Tap (cited in note 7); Ren& Uruefia, The Rise of the Constitutional
Regulatory State in Colombia: The Case of Water Governance, in Dubash and Morgan, eds, Rise ofthe
Regulator State of the South 27 (cited in note 9). In the public consultation process, some NGOs
called for more systematic attention to human rights in the PFI; see, for example, the Amnesty
International submission in the PF Public Responses Compilation at 8 (cited in note 48). But the
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) (officially representing business
views at the OECD), in its comments, suggested that "the issue of human rights is part of the
broader OECD principles and commitments to 'democratic government and the market
economy' that serve as the foundation of the Organization ....
[iMhe PFI should include a
reference to the principles of democratic governance and free markets as foundation [sic] of
sustainable development directly in the preamble ...... PF1Public Responses Compilation at 12. The
final version of the preamble states that the PF1 "builds on universally shared values of
democratic society and respect for human rights, including property rights." PFI at 7 (cited in note
42). The term "human rights" thus finds a place in the text, but the substance is inflected to be
compatible with the investment agenda, and much of the detailed critique in other NGO
submissions was not incorporated or acknowledged.
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A. Theories of the State and Its Role
The instruments acknowledge, in various ways, the controversy regarding
public versus private sector provision of particular types of infrastructure,72 but
for the most part do not confront the question head-on. The World Bank
Handbook indirectly argues for private sector provision. Its self-declared focus is
on economic regulation. As commercialized entities are much more responsive
to regulation of this kind than are public entities shielded from market pressures,
it assumes some degree of commercialization, and commercialization, in turn, is
said to require a significant degree of private sector involvement, particularly in
the developing world.73 The UNCITRAL and OECD instruments are more
ambivalent. Early sections of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide disavow any
attempt to prescribe private ownership or involvement, 4 and as discussed below,
the ModelProvisions do not take any position on which sectors should be open to
concession contracts (although the whole thrust of UNCITRAL's work on
privately financed infrastructure is to foster the environment thought to be
required in order to attract private finance). The Preamble to the OECD Private
Sector ParticipationPriniples similarly states that the principles "shall not be
construed as advocating the privatisation or private management of publicly
owned infrastructure," and calls instead for the choice of public or private
provision to be "guided by an objective assessment of what best serves the
public interest."7 5
72

For acknowledgments of the failures of some earlier privatization initiatives, see, for example,

73

Handbook at xii, 13-14 (citedin note 3); PFI Review ofGood Practices at 209, 211, 220 (cited in note
45).
Handbook at 21-22, 90 (cited in note 3).

74

Legislative Guide at 4 (cited in note 31) ("The line between publicly and privately owned
infrastructure must be drawn by each country as a matter of public policy.... No view is
expressed in the Guide as to where the line should be drawn in a particular country.'). See also id
at 9.

75

However on the preceding page there is a statement that "encouraging private sector participation
is an option that governments cannot afford to ignore." PrivateSector ParticipationPrinciplesat 9-10
(cited in note 43). The "objective assessment of what best serves the public interest" becomes, in
the words of Principle 1, "cost-benefit analysis taking into account all alternative modes of
delivery, the full system of infrastructure provision, and the projected financial and non-financial
costs and benefits over the project lifecycle." Id at 12. The PFI asks directly "Has the government
evaluated the investment needs in water required to support its development goals? To what
extent is the private sector involved in water management, supply and infrastructure financing?"
PF!at 21 (cited in note 42). However, the "annotations" accompanying these questions do not
directly advocate for greater private sector involvement (and indeed are quite inconclusive,
suggesting perhaps some contestation over the text in the drafting process). Id at 62-63. For a
complaint that a draft of the PFI referred too "half-heartedly" to the importance of private sector
participation in infrastructure, see the comments of BIAC in PFI Public Responses Compilation at 22
(cited in note 48). The draft PFI was in fact changed to slightly amplify the extent to which the
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Although they vary in the extent to which they explicitly endorse greater
private sector involvement, the instruments examined here generally support a
shift to a neoliberal model in which the state draws back from any direct role in
managing or providing access to certain infrastructure previously controlled by
the public sector. Typically, the reliance on private sector actors is thought to
require the creation of an "independent" regulatory agency, at one remove from
the government and the relevant ministry. 6 A preference for commercialized or
wholly privatized provision is thus associated with the turn to a "regulatory"
state in which the state acts not through direct control of infrastructure but
rather through the development and maintenance of a regulatory structure
overseeing market-based provision.V
The instruments envisage relations between actors in terms of a contract or
balance. Sometimes the state and public authorities are explicitly named as
actors, as "partners," whose interests must be considered alongside those of
investors. In other instances, the state is not seen as an actor or partner to the
transaction so much as the guarantor of the background conditions required for

76

77

private sector can not only finance but also more fully participate in the provision of
infrastructure, though not with the exact language suggested by BIAC. (Compare PI at 60, final
paragraph under 9.1); OECD, PFI: Draft Text for Public Consultation *47 (Jan 2006), online at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/35815912.pdf (visited May 18,
2013) ("Private investors can ease the call on public funds to finance a country's infrastructure
maintenance and development.'). The PFI Review of Good Practices cautions that, while "[p]rivate
participation is often advocated because it provides an alternative source of financing to
governments that have limited resources," this reasoning is "flawed" because the infrastructure
still has to be paid for by someone. Instead the Review suggests that "[t]he real advantage of welldesigned private participation is different and deeper: it lies in changing the political economy of
infrastructure provision ... [to] more easily allow genuine competition." PFI Review of Good
Practicesat 211, 220 (cited in note 45).
For example, the PI asks "Are the regulatory agencies that oversee infrastructure investment and
the operations of enterprises with infrastructure investments independent from undue political
interference?" PFI at 21 (cited in note 42). The importance attached by the World Bank and
investors to the creation of an independent regulatory agency is apparent in certain evidence cited
by the arbitral decision in BiwaterGauff(lanrania)Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No
ARB/05/22, (Award of July 24, 2008), In535-44, 571-77, 608-21, online at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSID/FrontServlet?requestTvpe=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC1589_En&caseld=C67 (visited May 18, 2013). In this case, the tribunal found that
Tanzania's failure to establish an independent regulator constituted a breach of Tanzania's
obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment insofar as it represented a departure from the
investor's expectation, based on several undertakings, that such a regulator would be created, the
failure to establish an independent regulator did not, in the particular circumstances of the case,
have any negative impact on the investor.
On this notion of the "regulatory state" and its relevance to privatization, see Giandomenico
Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of
Governance, 17 J Pub Poly 139, 144 (1997).
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the proper balancing of interests between investors and their counterparts,
whether conceived of as citizens or consumers.
Of the Handbook'sthree "meta-principles," "credibility" refers to investors'
confidence that the regulator will honor commitments, "legitimacy" is defined as
consumers' confidence that the regulator will protect them from monopoly
power, and "transparency" is "implie[d]" from the other two: "the regulatory
system must operate transparently so that investors and consumers 'know the
terms of the deal.' "78 The Handbook states that together, these meta-principles
confer "legitimacy" on a regulatory system, helping foster a "demand" for
sustainable regulation and thus allowing the regulatory system to take root. " The
meta-principles are structured in the form of a bargain: something for both sides
(investors and consumers, rather than the government or citizens as a whole),
together with the conditions required for both parties to have confidence they
are getting what is due. While recognizing the need for the regulatory system to
be embedded in the society as a whole, the Handbook places the government in
the background, as providing the institutions to support the bargain.
The PFI Review of Good Pracices similarly sees in the recommended
institutional structure of independent regulatory agencies "an attempt to
reconcile the partly competing demands for investor protection and public
legitimacy."8 Principle 10 of the PrivateSector ParidpalionPrindples recommends
that "[a]uthorities responsible for privately-operated infrastructure projects
should have the capacity to manage the commercial processes involved and to
partner on an equal basis with their private sector counterparts."81 The
authorities' role in this partnership is, however, confined to the careful custody
of the terms of the bargain, and does not extend to any direct opposition to the
private sector:
Public officials and administrative staff should not go to the extreme of
perceiving businesses' profit maximising behaviour as somehow
"illegitimate" or convey this impression to the public. Their duty to act in
78

Handbook at 55 (cited in note 3).

79

80

Id at 56 (cited in note 3). The PFI Review of Good Practicesat 210 (cited in note 45) takes a very
similar approach: 'To be credible to firms, the [infrastructure regulation] arrangement must be
sustainable, which means it must be perceived as reasonably fair and legitimate by consumers."
PFIReview of Good Practicesat 211 (cited in note 45):

81

If legitimacy could be ignored, investors' property rights would be most secure
if contractual tariff adjustment rules were interpreted by independent
international experts and serious disputes resolved by international arbitration.
Using national regulatory agencies, courts, or arbitration increases one type of
risk for investors, because the national institutions are more susceptible to
political pressures to keep prices below costs-but decisions made by national
institutions may be viewed as more legitimate, enhancing the sustainability of
the arrangements.
Private Sector ParticipationPrinciples at 19 (cited in note 43).

Vol. 14 No. 1

ErsatZ Normatinty: NationalInfrastmaure Regulation

Donaldson andKingsbug

the public interest is best expressed in the form of a competent, equitable
and diligent attention to contracts, regulation and legal frameworks.82

The state is thus called upon to undertake a wide range of functions to
create or preserve the conditions necessary for other actors-both corporations
and, where applicable, "independent" regulators-to operate. The Handbook
stipulates that, particularly where there is a need for major adjustments in
pricing, the government must support the regulator in pursuing often
controversial measures. 83 More generally, "[t]he police power of the state will be
needed to enforce laws against theft of service."' The state must also furnish a
range of other "pre-requisites," including legislative bodies capable of enacting
adequate laws, a functioning dispute resolution process, and a "reasonable
overall quality of country governance."" The Legislalive Guide calls for state
provision of "adequate administrative structures and practices, organizational
capability, technical expertise, appropriate human and financial resources and
economic stability," 86 and Principle 5 of the OECD Private Sector Paritation
Pnndples emphasizes the importance of a similarlist of characteristics. 87 The very
breadth of the PFI and the PF1 Review of Good Pracicesindicates the complexity of
the work to be done by the state in cultivating an environment in which
investors will be content to operate.88
This approach of situating the state as the provider and guarantor of the
overall system of governance within which investment occurs, rather than as an
advocate for a public interest counter to the interests of investors, is consistent
with the general preference for market-based approaches to delivery of public
services. It may also reflect a principled position that the state is required to take
this background role precisely because it is a party to a bargain (the relevant
concession contract, asset lease, or other arrangements), and thus cannot at the
same time be the deciding judge of performance under these contracts or

82

1d.

83

Handbook at 89-90 (cited in note 3).

84

Id at 90.

85

Id at 92-93.

86

Legislaive Guide at 2 (cited in note 31).

87

See text accompanying note 53.

88

This sensibility is broadly consistent with the "second wave" of law and development. This
"second wave" is characterized by greater regard for the social dimensions of development, such
as human welfare, rights and freedoms, even democracy (albeit often only insofar as these are
correlated with growth), rather than purely economic indicia; and it takes law and institutions as
central objects of concern (albeit with a range of different agendas, some most attentive to the
correlation between "rule of law" and economic development, others more open to normative
demands for rights and justice). See, for example, Kerry Rittich, The Futureof Law and Development:
Second Generation Reforms and the [ncorporationof the Social, 26 Mich J Intl L 199 (2004).
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arrangements.89 This instantiation of the liberal principle that no party can be a
judge in its own cause (nemo iudex in causa sua) would be consistent with the
relegation of the state to the status of any other (interest-driven) actor. This
characterization is, however, at odds with the general expectation that the state
take on a wide range of obligations in order for the transactions to succeed. The
tension is characteristic of the state after neoliberalism: the state is both suspect,
as a self-interested or captured actor (or conglomeration of self-interested
bureaucracies), and the bearer of unique responsibilities for the public welfare.
The general emphasis on "balancing" and the uncertain role of the state as
a party to, or guarantor of, the "balance," establishes a particular dynamic for
compromise and negotiation between the various interests at stake. The
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is telling in this respect. It identifies "transparency,"
"fairness," and "long-term sustainability" as "[g]eneral guiding principles for a
favorable constitutional and legislative framework." 9 ° The specification of what
each of these principles entail turns crucially on the way in which the relation
between the various actors is imagined. "Fairness," for example, is defined in
terms of a "fair legal framework," namely one that
takes into account the various (and sometimes possibly conflicting) interests
of the Government, the public service providers and their customers and
seeks to achieve an equitable balance between them. The private sector's business
considerations, the users' right to adequate services, both in terms of quality
and price, the Government's responsibility for ensuring the continuous
provision of essential services and its role in promoting national
infrastructure development are but a few of the interests that deserve
appropriate recognition in law.91
As exemplified by this discussion of what a "fair legal framework"
demands, the sheer ubiquity of the emphasis on balance and trade-offs can work
to suggest that investor interests and the public interest are on the same plane,
rather than the former being a necessary element of calculations regarding how
to achieve the latter. To be clear, all of the instruments are animated by a
conviction that, in at least some cases, greater private sector provision is in the

89

See, for example, Private Sector ParticipationPrinciples at 24 (cited in note 43) ("principle 17:
Regulation of infrastructure services needs to be entrusted to specialised public authorities that are
competent, well-resourced and shielded from undue influence by the parties to infrastructure
contracts.').

90
91

Legislative Guide at 23-24 (cited in note 31).
Id at 24 (emphasis added). See also id at 2 ('The advice provided in the Guide aims at achieving a
balance between the desire to facilitate and encourage private participation in infrastructure
projects, on the one hand, and various public interest concerns of the host country, on the
other.").
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public interest.92 Provision of an environment conducive to private sector
investment is presented as a means to achieve that public interest. However, the
instruments repeatedly either omit any reference to a public interest in favor of
seemingly narrower categories such as "government" or "consumer" interests, or
juxtapose the public interest and private sector interests, mingling the first order
objective with the second-order trade-offs required to attain it.
One motivation for structuring discussions of the positions of the different
actors in terms of "balance" may be a desire to push back against a reform
agenda perceived as excessively favorable to investors.93 On the other hand, this
structure might reflect the pull of the contractaian mindset or, more narrowly,
the perspective of private sector actors and advisers heavily engaged in law
reform and policy in the infrastructure field, for whom concessions would
primarily be perceived as transactions or partnerships in this sense. Regardless of
the intention, the prevalence of the references to "balancing" tends to reinforce
a view that the interests of investors on one hand and users, the state, or the
public, on the other, are of the same order. Insofar as these competing interests
are suggested to be determinative of what constitutes such things as a "fair legal
framework," the emphasis on "balance" opens the way for a renegotiation of the
terms of governance in which the perspectives of the private sector play a very
significant role. This becomes crucial in Section IV below, where we trace the
ways in which general, open-textured terms such as "fairness" and
"transparency" are attached to very specific institutional forms and legal
provisions.

92

93

Whether because private financing is the only viable source of funds, or, for example, because
competition between private actors holds them to higher standards, or because the private sector
has some specific expertise that the public sector does not, or has better incentives to forecast
accurately expected revenues and long-term costs of maintenance.
For example, while early discussion of UNCITRAL's work on privately financed infrastructure
was generally positive about the role of private finance, the Secretariat referred to the fact that it
had "borne in mind the need to keep the appropriate balance between the objective of attracting
private investment for infrastructure projects and the protection of the interests of the host
Government and the users of the infrastructure facility." Privately-FinancedInfrastructure Projects:
Draftchaptersof a legislativeguide onprivately-financedinfrastructureprojects, Report of the Secretay-General,
UN Doc A/CN.9/438 at 3 (Dec 18, 1996) (emphasis added). In subsequent discussions, many
delegates in the Sixth Committee reiterated this need for "balance." See, for example, summary
record of comments by Mr. Rao (India), in UN GAOR 6th Comm, 52d Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc
A/C.6/52/SR.3 at 4 (1997). See also comments of delegates of Malaysia, Iran, and Italy in UN
GAOR 6th Comm, 54th Sess, 3d mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.3 at 8-10 (1999); 4th mtg UN
Doc A/C.6/54/SR.4 at 2 (1999).
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B. Interventions in, and Visions of, Law
The instruments all envisage potentially extensive reforms to national legal
systems, from the constitution down. The most specific recommendations for
legal reform are made in the Handbook and the UNCITRAL materials (and the
UNCITRAL Model Provisions actually take the form of text intended to be
incorporated into national statutes). Given that the instruments are intended to
help foster a legal and institutional framework that supports a single dominant
model of infrastructure delivery, it is unsurprising that the instruments actively
promote changes to existing laws, in a relatively targeted and disaggregated way,
and reflect a largely instrumental view of law as something to be recast in order
to serve as a tool for the achievement of policy ends.94 However, the extent of
this instrumentalization is striking.
As one would expect from the interstate nature of UNCITRAL and its
general focus on legal harmonization, UNCITRAL materials go further than the
Handbook in acknowledging and accommodating existing features of national
legal regimes, and adverting to the complexities arising from connections
between infrastructure and other areas of law. " The Handbook, for example, goes
so far as to specify a standard for judicial review of decisions of the independent
regulatory agency (without any indication of how this standard is intended to
relate-if at all-to the standard of review used in other contexts, or even by
regulators in non-infrastructure sectors). The Legislalive Guide, by contrast, simply
provides that "[t]he law should establish transparent procedures whereby the
concessionaire may request a review of regulatory decisions by an independent
and impartial body, which may include court review, and should set forth the

9

For discussion and critique of a similar pattern in the World Bank's "Doing Business" indicators,
see RalfMichaels, The Functionalismof Legal Origins, in Michael Faure and Jan Smits, eds, Does Law
Matter? On Law and Economic Growth 21 (Intersentia 2011); Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by
Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57
Numbers?Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the
Am J Comp L 765; Bdnddicte Fauvarque-Cosson and AnneJulie Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic
Contest?FrenchReactions to the Doing Business World Bank Reports and the EconomicAnalysis of Law, 56
Am J Comp L 811.

95

Legislative Guide at 6, 189 (cited in note 31) (identifying a range of areas of law, beyond the
framework for concessions contracts, which may affect investment (from intellectual property to
administrative law, contract law, company law, and environmental protection), and discussing in
some detail the international treaties and standards operative in these areas). The Handbook, on the
other hand, gives little sense of how the legal regime recommended for infrastructure regulation
relates to different areas of public and private law implicated in the recommendations (which
might encompass some or all of administrative law, laws of evidence, civil procedure, corporate
law, employment law, and so forth). The overall picture is one of a legal enclave applicable to a
subset of regulators and only tenuously related to the surrounding fabric of norms and
institutions.

Vol 14 No. 1

Ersatz Normatiity:NationalInfrastructureRegulation

Donaldson and Kinigsbug7

grounds on which such a review may be based."96 In presenting this
recommendation, the Legislalive Guide notes the wide variety of bodies exercising
powers of review in different countries, and adds that "in many cases there are
limits, in particular as to the right of the appellate body to substitute its own
discretionary assessment of facts for the assessment of the body whose decision
is being reviewed."9
Even the UNCITRAL process, however, reflects an impetus towards
sweeping reform of national systems. In debates about whether it was even
possible to determine model legislative provisions for privately funded
infrastructure, rather than the more open-ended Legislative Guide, some states and
experts were opposed to any attempt to develop model provisions on the basis
that "many of the crucial issues of private investment in infrastructure did not
lend themselves to be properly addressed within the context of a model law,
being of a political rather than of a legal nature."98 However, the counterposition-which appears to have prevailed-was that a more deliberate effort to
facilitate the surmounting of legal differences was essential. The early decision to
release only a legislative guide was criticized by the US delegate (in his personal
capacity), who observed:
Whereas in the past such work [of harmonization] may have been driven by
an attempt to reconcile doctrine-civil, common, socialist, and otherincreasingly we see the effort to reach functional results, to respond to
market demands, and to embody best practices, which may be quite
detached from any doctrinal roots. In my view, this was not done
sufficiently in this project. Here the market demand is clear: investors and
lenders require an infrastructure project and package of contracts that is
"bankable." This will not be the case if a host country lacks the framework
to "negotiate" deals, or if the governing law allows the host government to
99
alter matters too freely.

96

Legislative Guide at xiii (cited in note 31).

97

Id at 36. The Model Provisions do not include any provisions concerning the nature of the review
body, although other aspects of dispute settlement are addressed briefly. For example, model
provision 49 reads "Any disputes between the contracting authority and the concessionaire shall
be settled through the dispute settlement mechanisms agreed by the parties in the concession
contract." Model Provisions at 31 (cited in note 35).
From the UNCITRAL Secretariat's record of views at the colloquium held to gather perspectives
on whether or not model legislative provisions were feasible. Possible Future Work on Privately
FinancedInfrastructure Projects, Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.9/488 at 5 (July 5, 2001). See
also above note 34.
He went on to suggest that it was the perceived incompatibility of the civil law system with the
kinds of framework that, in his view, the market required, and the inability of the Commission to
face this, which partly explained reliance on the legislative guide form. Wallace, 8 Tul J Intl &
Comp L at 287 (cited in note 30). But see note 34 above for the views expressed in the UN 6th
Committee concerning the desirability of proceeding to draft model legislative provisions:
although the states most opposed to this were civil law states, the Rio Group and Belarus, which

98

99
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The subsequent development of the ModelProvisionsand contemplation of a
complete model law suggests an increasing orientation towards the surmounting
of political differences, expressed at the level of systems of law and doctrine, in
favor of a more or less uniform set of "best practices" commensurate with
inevitability or desirability of private sector involvement, and thus the
expectations of global investors. Of course, whether or not this can be attempted
or achieved in the more elaborate form of a complete model law remains to be
seen.'0
Other than in relation to property rights, the materials, and particularly the
Handbook, views existing legal norms as subject to reconfiguration in light of
functional demands.' The Handbook frequently mingles recommendations
concerning the content of law with recommendations concerning institutional or
bureaucratic factors. Principle 9, for example, which stipulates that the regulator
must have "appropriate institutional characteristics" to carry out its mandate,
encompasses "Commissioners who are appropriately insulated from short-term
political repercussions," bureaucratic requirements (concerning compensation,

also have civil law systems, favored the development of model legislative provisions. On the
importance of UNCITRAL "takfing] careful note of international financial and capital markets
and foster[ing] a willingness to modify existing national laws," see summary of comments of Ms.
Wilson, US delegate, in UN GAOR 6th Comm, 54th Sess, 4th mtg, UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.4 at 3
(1999).
100 It is telling that the UNCITRAL working group responsible for drafting the Model Provisionswas
unable to agree on a definition of "concession." It rejected a definition adopted by the European
Commission and ultimately opted for a definition of "concession contract" constrained by a list of
the authorities with which, and sectors in which, such concessions can be concluded. This
approach continued the trend in the Legislative Guide of steering clear of a body of concepts and
doctrine particular to certain (civil law) countries. LegislativeGuide at 3-4 (cited in note 31). On the
other hand, the failure to provide a more substantive definition of "concession" still seemed to
some experts to pose a danger to the coherence of national legal systems, leaving open the
possibility of opportunistic labeling of particular arrangements to avoid, or benefit from, local
laws based on the Model Provisions. See Bruno de Cazalet and John Crothers, Prisentationdes
dispositionslegislatives apes surlesprqjetsd'infrastructuresdfinancementprivi:Additif du guide legislatifde la
CNUDC[ [Presentation of the UNCHIRAL Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed
InfrastructureProjects:Addendum to the UNCTRAL Legislative Guide], Revue de Droit des Affaires
Internationales 33, 36-39 (2004).
101 The Handbook and the UNCITRAL materials sometimes suggest that property rights have some
natural or essential quality, as well as being an important means to the end of securing investment.
See, for example, Handbook at 197-200 (cited in note 3) (property rights "should be protected,
respected, and in no way treated arbitrarily, or unfairly abridged or violated by the regulatory
system.... [P]roperty itself should be treated with respect"). In this regard the documents
manifest a tension between the willingness to reconfigure other aspects of the law in sweeping
ways, and the respect for property rights-a parallel to what has been diagnosed as an "amalgam
of functionalism and formalism" in law and development discourse. Kerry Rittich, Functionalism
and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporagy Development and Governance Debates, 55 U
Toronto LJ 853, 863 (2005).
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education, training, adequate budgets, and the ability to retain outside
consultants and so forth)-but also a very specific system of judicial review:
All regulatory decisions should be subject to final appeal to a single,
impartial or independent, legally designated court or tribunal with the
following requirements. The specified appeal forum should possess
regulatory expertise. The regulatory decision should, with very limited
exception, remain in force while the appeal is pending. And the appeal body
should affirm regulatory decisions unless the following is true:
" The regulators acted beyond their legal authority.
" The regulators failed to follow appropriate procedural requirements.
" The regulators acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.
" The regulators acted against the plain weight of the evidence before
the court. 0 2
The amalgamation of the parameters of judicial review with more mundane
recommendations directed to efficient administration tends to suggest that
matters like the standard of review applicable to regulatory decisions, and the
funding arrangements enjoyed by the regulator, are of the same order.
Legal institutions and norms are assessed in the Handbook solely in terms of
their contribution to fostering a regime attractive to investors (although appeal
to public sentiment is an element of this calculus). As regards dispute settlement,
for example, the Handbook notes that where domestic courts are slow or corrupt,
thoroughgoing judicial reform will be necessary in the long run, but a short-term
solution is also required to get the regulatory system functioning. It
acknowledges that options such as alternative dispute resolution and pnivate
arbitration, which could be provided for in the contract, are not appropriate for
regulatory disputes involving, as they do, the interests of "nonparties" such as
consumers, and issues of public policy.' 3 Aside from these "theoretical
constraints on bypassing judicial or legally created appellate tribunals," there are
"practical, realpolitik reasons" not to do so: enforcing arbitral decisions is
difficult; resort to these alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can cause
"public resentment that 'outsiders' are deciding critical infrastructure matters in a
country other than their own"; and there are "basic legal and constitutional
questions about using private means to enforce or overrule the otherwise lawful
decisions of duly constituted agencies of the state."" The proposed approach is
to allow disputes to be adjudicated by the courts but, where possible, to create
specialized tribunals to handle these disputes, or at least allow for optional or
mandatory recourse to a panel of experts that could provide non-binding advice.

102

Handbook at 62-63 (cited in note 3).

103

Id at 105.

104

Id at 105-06.
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Using specialized tribunals and, to a lesser extent, expert advisers, would
"increas[e] the probability that decisions would be made in a consistent manner
with a coherent and discernible pattern."'0' The emphasis is on outcomes and
particularly their role in stabilizing and rendering predictable the regulatory
regime.
The Handbook recognizes differences in the relative status of legal
instruments, and favors promulgation of statutes (rather than executive decrees)
as the means of establishing regulators and governing regulatory processes.
However, the fact that legislation is "more representative of political will," more
transparent, and more likely to be the subject of public debate is important
because these features make changes to the regime, once it is established, more
difficult."° There is no suggestion that it matters, other than perhaps for practical
reasons relating to likelihood of passage, whether a statute was drafted in a
consultative manner, rather than formulated by the executive on the advice of
global consultants. Indeed, the Handbook recommends including a local lawyer
on the project team, so that, if the government accepts particular
recommendations, the consultants can provide advice on specific language
required to implement the recommendations, thus avoiding "the delay of a
second and separate legal analysis."' 17 The focus is on the capacity of law to
organize processes and structure incentives, rather than on deeper and more
political dimensions of law-its connection to self-government and political
representation, its role in expressing particular values, its connection to particular
modes of discourse (legislative debate or judicial reason-giving), or even its
1 Little consideration is shown for the intrinsic
dynamic and systemic qualities. 08
importance of political dimensions of law. This creates something of a paradox:
in the longer term, it is likely that law can only work in the instrumental way
intended-as a guarantee of stability, or more broadly as a mark of the
acceptability of the new arrangements in the eyes of the population-if it is
understood by the public as something more than merely instrumental.

105

Idat 106.

106

Handbook at 186 (cited in note 3).

107

Id at 34.

108 On the other hand, the ends perceived to be served by law reform are not necessarily limited to
satisfying investor expectations. Legal reform is sometimes seen by those involved as part of a
larger effort of education and persuasion: "To require countries, their elites, governments, and
legislatures and hopefully their people to face up to the dilemmas and 'tragic' choices:
development and improvement vs aversions and hesitations as to capitalism, nationalism vs
globalism, past prejudices vs future hopes." Don WallaceJr., PrivateCapitalandInfrastructure:Tra c?
Useful and Pleasant? Inevitable, in Michael Likosky, ed, Privatising Development TransnationalLaw,
Infrastructure and Human Rights 131, 138 (Brill 2005).
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IV. FORMS AND VOCABULARIES OF LAW
Thus far we have suggested that, although there are variations between the
instruments surveyed, their intervention in national public law tends to be
shaped by a largely instrumental vision of law, in which law is used to bring
about a model regulatory system informed principally by economics. Despite this
thin view of national legal systems, however, the instruments draw heavily on a
vocabulary that has important connections to traditions of public law. The
instruments are framed hierarchically, such that the higher order principles
articulated in this vocabulary come to be associated with very specific
institutional structures and legal reforms.
A. Hierarchical

Structures

Each of the instruments involves some more or less explicit hierarchization
between general statements or recommendations and more detailed notes or
explanations (the precise relation varies). The Handbook is somewhat unusual,
even among comparable texts, in the extent of the connections it makes between
general principles and specific institutional reforms. The Handbook sets out its
best practice model in a three-tiered structure. At the peak of the whole edifice
are the three "meta-principles" ("credibility," "legitimacy," and "transparency")
which, according to the Handbook, any regulatory regime, transitional or
otherwise, must satisfy if it is to function."° The Handbook identifies ten
"principles" necessary to implement the meta-principles in the context of an
independent regulator model: independence, accountability, transparency and
public participation, predictability, clarity of roles, completeness and clarity in
rules, proportionality, " provision to the regulator of the powers required to
carry out its mandate, appropriate institutional characteristics,"' and integrity.
The "principles" are in turn accompanied by numerous "standards," constituting
"a checklist of specific actions that would be needed to implement the 3 metaprinciples and 10 general principles ... provid[ing] the bridge to go ... from the
'theoretical' to the 'practical.' "112 The standards are organized under headings
which correspond to the "principles" in some instances (e.g. proportionality),
but do not correspond with them in others. For example, the first three
standards, titled "legal framework," "legal powers," and "property and contract
rights," transcend the confines of any one principle.
109
110

Handbook at 59 (cited in note 3).
That is, recourse to the minimum regulatory intervention necessary to attain particular goals for
the sector.

111 For example, appropriate education and training opportunities for commissioners and staff.
112

Handbook at 185 (cited in note 3).
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In texts negotiated among groups with somewhat divergent national views,
such as the UNCITRAL materials or the OECD PFI, the juxtaposition of
abstract principles with more specific material might leave some flexibility for
local choices, and it enables global institutions to set out a relatively ambitious
program of reform while accommodating dissent on particular points.113 On the
other hand, the lower-order detailed discussion is likely in some cases simply to
reinforce the higher-order recommendation."' Some tailoring to local
circumstances is accommodated in the Handbook; for example, the standards
provide different mechanisms to ensure transparency, depending on whether the
multimember regulatory commission makes decisions by voting or by
negotiation and consensus.115 The Handbook also refers to "transitional regulatory
systems," which are not expected to meet all the standards set out as best
practice. However, the meta-principles, principles, and standards still serve as a

113

114

See, for example, Block-Lieb and Halliday, 42 Tex Intl LJ at 479-81,507-12 (cited in note 10). A
structure of agreed ends (in the form of framework goals), but relative flexibility as to means,
coupled with uniform approaches to assessing the degree to which the agreed ends have been
attained, and ongoing deliberation and learning among elites and experts about the efficacy of
different means, has been characterized in the EU context as a distinctive form of
"experimentalist" governance. See, for example, Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning
from Difference: The NewArchitecture of ExperimentalistGovernance in the EU, in Charles F. Sabel and
Jonathan Zeitlin, eds, ExperimentalistGovernance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture 1
(Oxford 2010).
Block-Lieb and Halliday, 42 Tex Intl L J 1 at 501 (cited in note 10). Something of this kind is
evident in the Legislative Guide's discussion of regulatory design. Recommendation 8 provides that
"[r]egulatory competence should be entrusted to functionally independent bodies with a level of
autonomy sufficient to ensure that their decisions are taken without political interference or
inappropriate pressures from infrastructure operators and public service providers." Legislative
Guide at xii (cited in note 31). The discussion of this recommendation adds that there are
"different options that have been used in domestic legislative measures to set up a regulatory
framework for privately financed infrastructure projects" and that "the Guide does not thereby
advocate the establishment of any particular model or administrative structure." Id at 31.
Different options are introduced: "While there are countries that entrust regulatory functions to
organs of the Government (for example, the concerned ministries or departments), other
countries have preferred to establish autonomous regulatory' agencies, separate from the
Government." Id at 32. But the longer "notes" lead almost inexorably to the conclusion that an
independent regulatory agency is preferable:
The efficiency of the regulatory regime is in most cases a function of the
objectiveness with which regulatory decisions are taken. This, in turn, requires
that regulatory agencies should be able to take decisions without interference
or inappropriate pressures from infrastructure operators and public service
In order to achieve the desired level of independence it is
providers ....
advisable to separate the regulatory functions from operational ones by
removing any regulatory functions that may still be vested with the public
service providers and entrust them to a legally and functionally independent
entity.

115

Id at 32-33.
Handbook at 233-34 (cited in note 3).
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benchmark for assessing progress in transitional regulatory systems,116 and even
transitional regimes are expected to evolve to the best practice model over time.
Moreover, the Handbook does not suggest that the "standards" proposed may be
replaced by divergent local approaches capable of fulfilling the same
"principles." The main force of the hierarchical organization of the Handbook's
benchmarks thus lies not in the openings it provides for local variation but in the
way it works to enforce the coherence and persuasiveness of the
recommendations overall.
The hierarchical form of the Handbook-the pattern of precise directions in
the service of more general "principles"-has some affinity to the structure of
bodies of law and of legal systems. Both the systemic quality, and the oscillation
between the general and the particular, are common to positive law and modes
of legal reasoning, although they may also be a feature of bureaucratic ordering
more generally. "7 The use of a structure associated with law may itself be a part
of the rhetorical appeal of the Handbook. Whether or not this is the case, the
edifice of "meta-principles," "principles," and "standards" gives comprehensive
and systematic content to abstractions such as "legitimacy." Conversely, these

16
117

Id at 92.
The formal resemblance between the recommendations and a hierarchy of legal norms, however,
is somewhat belied by the content. Higher order "principles" in law tend to both retain some
residual meaning not exhausted by more specific provisions, and to have some autonomous
normative or purposive content that renders them susceptible to reinterpretation over time. While
the "meta-principles" have the abstraction common to "principles" as higher order legal norms,
the wider context of the Handbook makes clear that these are not analogous to constitutional
provisions, capable of re-interpretation through normative argument about what "legitimacy" as
such demands, or about how to blend deontological and utilitarian considerations. Rather, the
meta-principles reflect almost purely functionalist assumptions about what is required to attract
private investment and maintain support for this arrangement, or at least its toleration, by the
public (id at 1, 13) which is in turn connected to a theory that only this investment can provide the
infrastructure vitally necessary for development. The "principles" are then interpreted in light of
this pre-ordained structure. Of course, it may not be the case that investors are most reassured by
exactly the measures set out in the Handbook; confidence in the security of investments might also
flow from close relationships with senior officials, for example, or close relationships between the
host state and the investors' home state governments, or possibilities for issue linkage in other
areas (the latter two may be particularly relevant, at least once disputes have arisen, where
investors are themselves state-owned). For one example of findings running counter to the
consensus presented in the Handbook, see Sheoli Pargal, Regulation and Private Sector Participationin
Infrastructure,in William Easterly and Luis Servdn, eds, The Limits of Stabilization: Infrastructure,Public
Deficits, and Growth in Latin America 171, 185 (World Bank 2003) (noting that, for a set of Latin
American countries, private investment volumes are significantly positively related to the
infrastructure regulatory body being housed within a ministry, rather than as an independent
agency-a result that the author suggests may be connected to the historically strong position of
executives in Latin America, and thus reflective of the general importance of credibility and
predictability of the regulatory framework, albeit under the specific conditions prevailing in those
polities).
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abstractions, posited as universal and framed in a language that itself carries a
normative charge-a matter to which we turn next-validate the specific
prescriptions by connecting them up to a broader vision of the political economy
of infrastructure.
B. Vocabularies of Law, Governance,

Economy

A passage from the detailed "notes" on "Regulatory process and
procedures" in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide provides:
The regulatory framework typically includes procedural rules governing the
way the institutions in charge of the various regulatory functions have to
exercise their powers. The credibility of the regulatory process requires
transoarengy and objectiviy, irrespective of whether regulatory authority is
exercised by a government department or minister or by an autonomous
regulatory agency. Rules and procedures should be objective and clear so as
to ensure fairness, impartiality and timely action by the regulatory agency. For
purposes of transparency, the law should require that they be made public.
Regulatory decisions should state the reasons on which they are based and
should be made accessible to interested parties, through publication or other
appropriate means." 8
Read in isolation, parts of this passage could plausibly be taken from a text
on (Anglo-American) administrative law or even legal philosophy-or from a
work on institutional economics. Similarly, setting the Handbook's "principles""' 9
alongside articulations of the values or characteristics of public law, or the
properties of law as a whole, is revealing. In some cases, the principles
mentioned in the Handbook find more or less direct counterparts in these other
discourses. "Accountability" and "public participation," for example, also appear
in administrative law scholar Michael Taggart's list of public law values, and the
"principle" of "transparency" bears a relation to the value of "openness."' 2 In
other cases, the "principles" have counterparts at the level of concept, if not
vocabulary. "Predictability," for example, corresponds to a number of Fuller's
attributes of a legal system: that rules be published, intelligible, possible to
comply with, prospective, not subject to constant change, and followed by the
officials enforcing them. Principles of clarity of roles, and completeness and
clarity in rules, also correspond to some of Lon Fuller's attributes (published
118

119

120

Legislative Guide at 35 (cited in note 31) (emphasis added). See also id at 26. Compare this passage
to the Handbook's meta-principles of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency.
Independence, accountability, transparency and public participation, predictability, clarity of roles,
completeness and clarity in rules, proportionality, provision to the regulator of the powers
required to carry out its mandate, appropriate institutional characteristics, and integrity.
Tagart's distillation of "public law values"includes: openness, fairness, participation, impartiality,
accountability, honesty, and rationality. Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law
Determined,in Taggart, ed, The Proinceof Administrative Law 1, 3 (Hart 1997).
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rules, free from contradiction) and perhaps to a public law value of
"rationality. 12
The instruments are representative of a genre of "good governance"
literature which is shaped in part by public law traditions, but informed also by
criteria of bureaucratic and economic efficiency." 2 The fact that many of the
terms that recur across the instruments, particularly in the Handbook's principles
and in the higher-order content of the UNCITRAL and OECD materials, have
affinities with vocabularies of public law within the state, and by association with
ideals of democracy and self-government with which public law has historically
been connected, no doubt gives the terms some normative appeal. Accordingly,
one analysis of the instruments might be that they co-opt normatively charged
terms to lend an aura of legitimacy and consensus to much narrower, and
politically contestable, prescriptions for institutional and legal reform.
"Transparency,"
"fairness,"
"predictability,"
and "impartiality" seem
unobjectionable, but in the international instruments on infrastructure studied
here, this hybrid vocabulary takes its meaning primarily from the functional
demands of attracting private sector investment, in accordance with the
"balancing" between public and private, and the terms are thus defined, whether
explicitly or implicitly, in a way that does not do justice to their roots in political
ideals. Such a reading would echo concerns that the vocabulary and values of
public law are being deployed to further an economic agenda, or that the
vocabulary of law itself is being deployed to legitimize a managerial discourse. 23
Of course, some degree of hybridization is already nascent in each of the
strands that are drawn together: public law principles and values are to some
Fuller's desiderata for a legal system include the existence of general rules and their publication,
prospectivity, clarity, compatibility, possibility of compliance, constancy, and congruence with
officials' actions. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale rev ed 1969).
122 For example, those responsible for producing the bank's "Worldwide Governance Indicators"
121

123

have acknowledged the multiplicity and diversity of definitions of "governance," and in particular
a divergence regarding the importance of democratic accountability to citizens, but have
nevertheless concluded that there is some degree of consensus on "the importance of a capable
state operating under the rule of law." The functionalist, neoliberal orientation of the
"governance" measured by bank indicators is relatively clear, but many aspects of this agenda,
particularly those concerning rule of law, the functioning of regulatory institutions, and the
control and oversight of public officials, have also been central to public law. See Daniel
Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going? *6
(World Bank
Policy Research
Working Paper No
4370, 2007),
online at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4370 (visited May 19,
2013). For further iterations of the indicator's composition, see Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay,
and Massimo Mastruzzi, 7he Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues *3
(World Bank
Policy Research
Working Paper No
5430,
2010),
online at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/WGI.pdf (visited May 19, 2013).
See, for example, Somek, Administrationwithout Sovereigny (cited in note 2).
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extent shaped by considerations of political economy and the efficient
management of the state, as well as by ideals of democracy and self-government.
Conversely, as is evident from the focus of the instruments on property rights,
economic models of regulation are heavily reliant on a certain class of property
rights, if not on any broader range of civil or political rights. We suggest that the
invocation in the instruments of a hybrid vocabulary, reaching into each of these
traditions, does not simply pass one thing (instrumental features of governance)
off as another (public law), but rather brings the two into relation. The
vocabulary in which the Handbook's "principles," for example, are expressed is a
new lingua franca, incorporating terms taken from different discourses.124 The
instruments arguably deploy this vocabulary-rather than, say, a more purely
technical economic vocabulary-precisely because, while normatively charged, it
is not reducible to a single established set of substantive commitments.
Government officials, experts, non-government organizations, and corporations
may all find the language familiar; although they might understand its contents in
radically different ways, they can deploy it to speak intelligibly to one another,
and it may both appeal to, and be taken up by, similarly socialized elites in
countries or organizations with otherwise inimical values or political structures.
The very indeterminacy of the language may both make possible the
persistence of very different understandings of its content, by concealing the
magnitude of differences in substantive understanding, and provide a platform
for diffusion and cross-fertilization of ideas about this content between actors
who appear to have committed to similar programs. For example, the Handbook
accepts the likely pluralism of views on concepts such as "fairness," and
envisages patterns of borrowing and transposition as the various actors deal with
each other:
To be acceptable, the process by which [regulatory] decisions are made must
be consistent with local notions of fairness and justice. The other
perspective that needs to be satisfied is that of the investors, many of whom
are likely to be foreign, in the case of developing countries. Just as residents
of the country need to be satisfied that the process is fair, so too do
international investors who may have different views of fairness than local
residents.

25

The political consequences of this process of diffusion remain open to
some extent. Given the relative positions of investors and groups within host
states that may be able to influence the process of regulatory decisionmaking,

124

125

On the deliberate adoption of universal vocabularies as a strategy for building consensus and
avoiding the impression that particular national approaches dominate global deliberations, see
Block-Lieb and Halliday, 42 Tex Intl L J at 498-500 (cited in note 10).
Handbook at 230 (cited in note 3). See also the strikingly similar passage on "fairness" and a "fair
legal framework" in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, in text accompanying note 91 above.
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there is room for skepticism about the likely shape of the consensus on
"fairness" that might emerge from the process envisaged above. On the other
hand, rhetorical and conceptual limits to this language, and to terms such as
"fairness," rule out some artifices of reconstruction. Precisely because of their
abstract and normative dimensions, the invocation of these terms may open
avenues for contestation that could develop into some more democratic and
emancipatory system. Conversely, the invocation and deployment of this
language may drain its normative significance and political potential. As
prescriptions for national legal systems are articulated in greater detail,
architectural projects of global public law, discussed in the following Section,
may prove to be important interventions in struggles over the direction of
transnational influence and national developments.
V. GLOBAL PUBLIC LAW AS AN AVENUE FOR THE RENEWAL
OF PUBLIC LAW
Despite the significant influence which global prescriptions may have on
national public law, and despite the fact that these prescriptions are framed in a
vocabulary that bears a relation to traditions of public law, much of the activity
involved in the preparation of the instruments considered here, and their use,
seems to fall beyond at least traditional conceptions of national public law,
private international law, and public international law. 26 In this Section, we
explore the extent to which two accounts of an emergent global public law,
namely international public authority and global administrative law, offer any
greater purchase on these instruments-and what challenges the instruments
pose for these new visions of global public law.
A global public law applied to the prescriptive but non-binding
international instruments studied in this Article might have at least two purposes:
first, rendering this governance activity intelligible in legal terms, so as to foster
(inter alia) some structure in which policymakers or communities might engage
with the transnational pressures being brought to bear; and second, vindicating
some sense of the specificity and complexity of law as both a set of existing
norms and a distinct intellectual and political practice.
In this Section, we focus on the "hardest" case of transnational influence of
those considered here: preparation of an instrument like the Handbook (highly
detailed in its prescriptions, but developed without any formal involvement of
state representatives), and the conduct of evaluations pursuant to it. The fact that
126

It is not that governance falls "beyond" the domain of these bodies of law; rather, the law permits
the activity, without regulating it in any detailed way. On private international law and global
governance, see Horatia Muir Watt, Private InternationalLaw Beond the Schism, 2 Transnatl Legal
Theory 347 (2011).
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work in particular international organizations has been endorsed by state
representatives (members of the executive often acting in pursuit of policies and
agendas which have not received any particular sanction from the legislature or
the populace as a whole), does not of course exhaust concerns about the
legitimacy of this transnational normative production, but it does ensure at least
a notional path by which individuals or groups within states might challenge, or
seek to influence, this activity through public law channels. The picture is
somewhat different in the case of the Handbook, insofar as this instrument is
developed by experts exercising their own knowledge and professional judgment
and without any formal relation of representation of a particular national
community.
A. Transnational

Governance

and Global Public Law

Orthodox public international law offers few resources for the analysis and
contestation of activity reflected in works such as the Handbook. International
organizations exist within and subject to public international law, and may be
responsible for internationally wrongful acts,' 27 but the legal norms applicable to
international organizations, and particularly the question of whether they are
directly bound by international human rights law, are contested.'28 It would be
difficult in practice to establish that non-negligent provision of good faith policy
advice, without domination and without any control over its use, constitutes an
internationally wrongful act in public international law.
There is increasing interest in arguments that processes of governance
transcending the political and legal apparatus of individual states either actually
are (properly understood), or should be, subject to some more comprehensive
structure of public law beyond those just surveyed, whether conceived as global
"constitutionalism," "inter-public law," "global administrative law," or notions of
"international public authority." These accounts are animated by a variety of
normative commitments, and they differ as regards both their conception of
existing institutions, and their doctrinal aspirations (for example, the extent to
which they understand themselves as articulating lex lata or lexferendi, or the
extent to which they claim a connection with international law rather than
domestic public law). However, they share a commitment to the notion that

127

International Law Commission, DraftArticleson the Responsibilio of InternationalOrganizations (2011)

128

Art 6-9 online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/engfish/draft/20articles/
9_11 2011.pdf(visited May 19, 2013).
For a detailed examination of the relationship between international law and the operations of the
MDBs, see the essays collected in Daniel D. Bradlow and David B. Hunter, eds, International
FinancialInstituions and InternationalLaw (Kluwer 2010).
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there is some distinct characteristic in law which may be isolated from its
functional role in governance.
We here briefly sketch two of these approaches-international public
authority and global administrative law-and assess the extent to which they
might respond to an exercise of governance power such as that manifest in the
preparation and invocation of the Handbook.
1. International Public Authority.
Animated by a concern to assert a distinctive legal perspective on the
phenomenon of governance, and to provide some means of reducing
contestation of "legitimacy" to more tractable arguments about legality, legal
scholarship on "international public authority" has pursued an ex ante
categorization of instances in which global governance institutions exercise
international public authority. Once so categorized, these exercises of
international public authority are subject to a corpus of public law, including
human rights law."
Von Bogdandy, Dann, and Goldmann argue for a framework in which
"authority" is held to be exercised not only when an institution issues binding
legal commands, but whenever an institution has the capacity to condition a legal
subject ("conditioning" including, for example, situations in which an act "builds
up pressure for another legal subject to follow its impetus," or an institution
"carves out the cognitive environment of the issue in a manner that marginalizes
alternative perspectives," as long as the communicative power involved reaches a
certain threshold). 1" The subject of this conditioning may be an individual, a
private association, an enterprise, or a state or public institution, although the
ultimate normative concern is one of individual freedom and political selfdetermination. 31 The "international public" character of authority, in relation to
particular persons, derives from its legal basis: the fact that it is exercised on the
basis of an (even informal, or "soft law") act of public authorities like states and
intergovernmental institutions-"an act of self-determination of a community to

129

130

On this approach, see Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann, Develcpingt/
Publicness of Public InternationalLaw: Towards a Legal Frameworkfor Global Governance Acivities, 9
German L J 1375 (2008); Armin von Bogdandy and Matthias Goldmann, Taming and Framing
Indicators:ALegal Reconstructionof the OECD's ProgrammeforlInternationalStudent Assessment, in Kevin
Davis, et al, eds, Governance by Indicators:GlobalPower Through Quantificationand Rankings 52 (Oxford
2012).
Von Bogdandy, Dann, and Goldmann, 9 German L J at 1376, 1382 (cited in note 129); von
Bogdandy and Goldmann, Taming and FramingIndicators at 66 (cited in note 129).

131 Von Bogdandv, Dann, and Goldmann, 9 German LJ at 1376, 1383 (cited in note 129).
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'
At least for intergovernmental
which the person affected belongs."132
institutions, this act will typically be the founding treaty or articles.
In the case of something like reform of domestic infrastructure law and
policy, the effect on the behavior of individualsas such is highly attenuated-the
actual effects on individuals' access to infrastructure or their ability to participate
in regulatory reform processes is mediated by the choices of evaluators regarding
what to recommend, and by the decisions of the government about what
recommendations to act upon and how to implement them. These governmental
decisions may also diverge from what evaluators would advise, although the
decisions will often be taken under pressure where the evaluation is a condition
of funding or aid, given that the whole thrust of the evaluation process is to
deliver ready-made reforms, including even constitutional and statutory changes.
The "authority" at stake in the issuing of the Handbook and in preparation of
evaluations in accordance with it is thus more akin to "conditioning" than
outright determination. (The judgment of when epistemic influence can be said
to have occurred at a sufficient threshold to "condition" behavior is, however, a
fine one. 33)
Preparation of a text such as the Handbook is one of a myriad of acts
undertaken by and under the auspices of intergovernmental institutions which,
although guided by internal procedures regarding the preparation of research
products, is unlikely to have any specific authorization from state representatives.
The ultimate legal basis of the preparation and publication of the Handbook, as
understood in the scholarship on international public authority, presumably lies
in the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. The Articles, which establish and govern the operation of the
World Bank, are, of course, remote from the actual activity that led to the
Handbook. From the standpoint of this scholarship, the use of the Handbook in
particular circumstances and the conduct of evaluations by teams of specialists
(at least insofar as the use occurs at the behest of particular donor or recipient
states) may actually be more plausible instances of "international public"
authority than the drafting of the Handbook in the first place. The difficulty of
determining whether the drafting of the Handbook, in particular, constitutes an
exercise of international public authority presents interesting questions and

132

133

This last formulation is given in Matthias Goldmann, A Matter of Perspective: GlobalGovernance and
the Distinctionbetueen Public andPrivateAuthority (andNot Law) (April 2013) (draft paper on file with
authors).
Moreover, in the realm of epistemic authority, it is perhaps unusual that one actor alone "carves
out the cognitive landscape" within which policies come to be conceived and debated. The picture
is more often one of gradual shifts in a discourse involving multiple entities or individuals, and
often influenced by a whole range of historic, economic, and social dimensions.
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illustrates the challenges of applying an essentially hierarchical and formal
classification to the messy circumstances of governance.
If defined as an exercise of international public authority, the preparation
of a prescriptive manual like the Handbook and the conduct of evaluations would
be subject to a public law framework, including both procedural dimensions
similar to those emphasized in global administrative law, and some substantive
component of fundamental rights. I" Von Bogdandy and Goldmann have
suggested that different "instruments" of governance may be subject to tailored,
public-law-inspired frameworks.13 The preparation of evaluations drawing on
the Handbook may be analogous in some respects to instruments that they
'
classify as "national performance assessments. l"
In their view, the terms of
such assessments should be laid out in advance (to ensure that political questions
do not become subject to purely bureaucratic and technocratic resolution), and
should involve debate and consultation with all groups concerned. Results of
assessments should accord with scientific principles, be justified, and be open to
criticism, perhaps in some institutionalized forum. Criteria of the kind articulated
for "national performance assessments" cannot necessarily be applied directly to
a program such as that set out in the Handbook, which (like probably the majority
of advisory tools) was generated within a global institution, partially nested
within a broader community of peer experts, rather than through any deliberate
prior decision by states' representatives or through a general consultative
process. However, if these criteria were applied, the modes of governance and
intervention exemplified by the Handbook, which prioritize targeted, expert
134

13s
136

See, for example, Armin von Bogdandy and Matthias Goldmann, Sovereign Debt Restructurings as
Exercises of InternationalPublic Authori: Towards a DecentralizedSovereign Insolvency Law, in Carlos
Esposito, Yuefen Li and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, eds, Sovereign Financingand InternationalLaw: The
UNCLAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borroning 39 (Oxford 2013). The rights
dimension might be articulated in various ways. At a minimum, global institutions and processes
undertaken under their auspices might be required to accommodate, rather than undermine,
existing rights and obligations of parties affected by the evaluation, including constitutional and
international law obligations of the states whose regulatory systems are under evaluation. In some
cases this may be a significant constraint on the approach taken by evaluators of both access to
infrastructure (in light of rights to health, food, water) and the process of regulatory reform (in
light of rights to, for example, political participation and equality).
Matthias Goldmarn, Inside Relative Normativio: From Sources to StandardInstrumentsfor the Exercise of
InternationalPublic Authorio, 9 German L J 1865 (2008).
These are defined as involving"the revelation of empirical information with a claim to objectivity
by international institutions that evaluate the outcomes of domestic policy, produced for the
purposes of the latter and coupled with a light enforcement mechanism for future domestic policy
that relies on the incentives created by iterative evaluations, public disclosure, country rankings,
and/or specific policy recommendations." Von Bogdandy and Goldmann, Taming and Framig
Indicators at 75 (cited in note 129). However, Handbook evaluations, though recommended for
general, periodic use, are most likely to be conducted on states seeking funding for infrastructure
support on a one-off basis rather than in regular assessments applicable to a number of states.
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intervention and cooperation with national executives to develop ready-made
reforms which are later presented to the legislature for enactment, would have to
change significantly before they attained the "legitimacy" for which the
international public authority account provides.
2. Global Administrative Law.
Global administrative law has been less concerned with sharp delineations
of authority into "public" and "private," and more concerned with procedural
constraints applicable to governance processes across different institutional sites,
in particular greater transparency, participation, reasoned decisionmaking, and
formal review. 3 ' Some elements of these procedural checks already exist within
specific individual institutions or regimes (albeit typically as institutional practice
or policy, the legally binding quality of which would depend on a practice
account of law that extends beyond conventional understandings of custom and
even "general principles" as sources of international law). 38
The World Bank-the institution to which the Handbook is most closely
connected-has adopted a range of what might be identified as global
administrative law mechanisms, including a revised "access to information"
policy, an Inspection Panel inquiring into compliance with internal policies, and
"safeguards" policies requiring public consultation on certain projects. These
institutional developments provide some possibilities for the contestation of
broad approaches evident in, for example, the Handbook, and their translation
into specific programs and projects. Interested groups may be able to track
evolving thinking on regulatory issues, or follow reports on how similar projects
have fared elsewhere, through documents released automatically, or by invoking
the access to information policy to request further documents. Where
evaluations and associated policy recommendations are used to underpin
projects in particular countries, the Inspection Panel may be invoked where the
level and nature of public consultation has fallen short of what is required by the
bank's internal policies.
However, there are limits to the potential of mechanisms such as these to
ensure that expert institutions and evaluators are accountable for the technical

137 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of GlobalAdministratie
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Law, 68 L & Contemp Probs 15 (2005).
See, for discussion, Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 'L.aw"in GlobalAdministrativeLaw, 20 EurJ
Intl L 23 (2009); Kuo, 10 IntlJ Const L 1050 (citedin note 2). Further systematization will depend
on the ways in which existing mechanisms can be disseminated through other institutions and
integrated with more basic and generally applicable legal principles, and on the development of
judicial or other fora in which they may be enforced. See, for example, Sabino Cassese, A Global
Due Process of Law, in Gordon Anthony, et al, eds, Values in GlobalAdministrativeLaw 17, 52-53
(Hart 2011).
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quality and consequences of the reforms they promote, and that these reforms in
fact reflect the wishes, needs, and priorities of citizens, and larger communities
of persons affected, rather than the agenda of ruling elites. In the context of the
Handbook, we identify three main limitations, some of which would also seem
applicable to the international public authority approach sketched above.
First, global administrative law is dependent on institutions and may have
relatively little purchase on epistemic authority. Some degree of formalization of
the exercise of power is required in order to subject this exercise to procedural
constraints, but much of the power exercised in and through documents such as
the Handbook, and the evaluations for which it provides, works through expertise
and the dominance of particular visions of the economy and polity. These are
crystallized through formal practices such as evaluation, preparation of reports,
decisions on project lending, and drafting of legislation. Global administrative
law (or, in the international public authority approach, norms extrapolated from
public law) might be applied at these points, perhaps by insisting, for example,
that the evaluation include consultation with particular marginalized
communities, or that the process by which the bank or other funders persuade
the government of necessary reforms be more transparent, or at least involve the
legislature or community groups in some meaningful way, rather than remaining
largely within the executive. However, insofar as the activity is understood to be
premised on particular knowledge or expertise and oriented toward a particular
end, such as efficient infrastructure provision, rights to access or participate in
these formal and institutional practices may not effect any real opening up of the
epistemic landscape or visions of the relevant ends. Where existing global
governance structures valorize expertise as a basis for authority, global
administrative law may merely serve to ensure wider access to, and participation
in, the wielding of this expertise, rather than challenging the privileging of
economic, legal, or accounting expertise in the first place. This was illustrated in
the public consultation phase of the OECD PFI: many of the submissions from
NGOs were fundamentally at odds with the approach taken in the OECD draft,
but these divergent perspectives could not be incorporated in any wholesale way,
and were largely left aside in the preparation of the final document.
Second, global administrative law focuses on the processes through which
decisions should be made, rather than on the "constitutional" question of which
bodies should be making the decisions, and on what basis they claim the
authority to do so (matters which, as noted above in the discussion of
"international public authority," may be extremely difficult to trace and
determine in the circumstance of global governance). Of course, the procedural
and "constitutional" are not easily separated. Even procedural norms such as
participation and accountability may indirectly orient thinking on foundational
questions of authority (for example, applying such procedural norms to
processes like evaluation in the Handbook might foster a more deferential or
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deliberative engagement with existing local law and practice). As global
administrative law evolves, it will increasingly confront questions of institutional
authority, constituency and representation.'39 For the moment, however, global
administrative law as it applies to global institutions and actors remains rather
insulated from these matters and, insofar as the global administrative law
approach suggests that decisions taken by a whole range of bodies might be
legitimated by procedural means, tends to be in some tension with substantive
demands that decisions be made in some institutions rather than others. While
institutional features such as access to information policies may assist critics in
gathering the information they need to build a campaign, the main thrust of
advocacy is likely to lie beyond, and in fact in opposition to, existing governance
structures.
If exercises such as the preparation of the Handbook and the conduct of
evaluations escape any ready analysis, let alone institutional scrutiny or recourse,
in public law terms, this is not necessarily attributable only to their extra-national
character. The decentralized, epistemic power in evidence in publications such as
the Handbook, together with the involvement of private actors (in the form of
individual experts and evaluators) may not be markedly different from purely
nationally driven reform scenarios, in which governments, even those not
seeking funding from the MDBs, are influenced to some extent by policy advice,
modeling, projections, and research from consulting firms, academics, thinktanks and the like (and, less salubriously, from lobbyists and interested parties
themselves) in addition to the views of their own bureaucrats. Only a limited
basis exists even in the developed public law of advanced democracies (implicitly
taken as a model by much of the advisory literature) for challenging the political
or social assumptions underlying expert advice or holding consultants or advisers
responsible if they later turn out to have been wrong."4 In theory, citizens in a
state in which the government has adopted reforms based on the expert advice
of a consulting firm may not be in that different a position from citizens in a
state in which the government has adopted reforms based on the intervention of
an international institution, MDB, or team of international experts. This does
not mean that national public law provides no resources for situations of this
kind-but simply that the role of expertise in governance presents a dilemma for
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broader participation and deliberation which is felt in many different sites, global
and local. 141
Third, the capacity of global administrative law to respond to the challenges
posed by instruments such as the Handbook may be limited by characteristics of
global administrative law which in fact have a deep kinship with some features of
the instruments themselves. We have argued that the instruments under
consideration here are structured in terms of a balance which sets off the
interests of investors against those of the state, or the "public," or users, with a
concomitant tendency to suggest that they are on the same plane. The lack of
any prescribed "constitutional" allocation of powers in global administrative law
may be a virtue insofar as it addresses the public implications of even "private"
governance activity, and is open to a "public" transcending national borders. On
the other hand, though, like the "balance" in the instruments themselves, global
administrative law as currently conceived may incline towards some open-ended
definition of "stakeholders" or constituencies in which corporate and civil
society interests or positions are traded off against each other, without any
formal hierarchization of a public interest, and with corporate or developed
country interests exercising greater influence in practice. This is the challenge of
reimagining a "public" in conditions in which national citizenship may no longer
provide a realistic or normatively defensible delimitation of the people for and in
whose name authority is exercised-but in which the lack of alternative
conceptions leaves few resources for principled arguments about the allocation
42
of voice and influence. 1
We have suggested above that the Handbook and other instruments
manifest, and make use of, a confluence of the vocabularies of public law and
governance. The central principles of global administrative law are framed in a
similar hybrid vocabulary in part because global administrative law too must be
at least intelligible within different traditions of public law, and capable of being
invoked in a wide range of different institutional contexts, public and private.
However, as with the vocabulary of the Handbook, the very malleability of some
of the central "principles" or "mechanisms" traced in global administrative law
leaves them open to redefinition and gradual evolution that will inevitably be
shaped by distributions of power. Given the current constellation of governance
institutions, and the structures of power within states, there is likely to be
considerable pressure for substantive understandings of international public law
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See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and Public Lav in Comparative Perspective, 60 U Toronto LJ
519, 528 (2010).
See, for discussion of the complexities of this "public," Benedict Kingsbury, InternationalLaw as
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or global administrative law principles that favor dominant interests,143 or those
able to advocate on their terms, and the convergence in overarching vocabulary
might make it difficult to challenge this.
B. Public Law as Mindset and Method
We have argued here that transnational governance activity, pursued within
international organizations but drawing on expertise that may not be anchored
either within that organization or within any state bureaucracy, might be
understood as subject to some body of global public law. As suggested earlier,
these public law perspectives on the prescriptive but non-binding international
instruments studied in this Article could aspire to fulfill at least two purposes:
laying the legal foundations for some structure in which policymakers or
communities might engage with transnational influences for national reform of
law and policy; and vindicating the specificity and complexity of law, both as a
set of existing norms and as a distinct intellectual and political practice."
As regards the first purpose, framings in terms of international public
authority or global administrative law could provide some basis for challenging
the exercise of power reflected in, and fostered by, the sorts of instruments
examined here, but the current reach of such framings is limited. International
public authority relies, for its analytical force and normative impetus, on the
identification of certain acts of international public authority, and this
identification requires both difficult (and possibly circular) assessments of the
effects of particular acts, and tracing the act to a founding legal basis which may
be quite removed from the realities of institutional life in which the act took
place. Global administrative law, for its part, manifests some of the problematic
features of the infrastructure instruments themselves, including a certain
indeterminacy regarding the interests or constituencies to be addressed, and the
mutability of the hybrid vocabulary of public law and governance.
The attempt to articulate a global public law may still be intellectually
productive, even if particular framings of global public law cannot at present
meet the challenges posed by transnational governance. The commitment to
recovering law as a distinct mode of ordering, and an intellectual practice, mayif nothing else-clarify the normative and rhetorical terrain and enable more
principled argument about policy recommendations and the grounds on which
they are based. Over the longer term, this has some potential to shore up the
specifically legal dimension of global prescriptions, and to preserve a space for
143
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state systems to develop their own public (and other) law in a manner that, while
addressing social needs and priorities effectively, is not entirely shaped by
functionally oriented governance imperatives. Work in this vein will require
careful attention to the distinct intellectual and historical lineages of the
vocabularies in circulation, and the different political visions and values on which
these vocabularies draw, as well as reflection about modes of comparativism and
generalization.
One response to the hybridization of vocabularies of law and governance
has been to insist on distinguishing public law from other discourses. Carol
Harlow's work, for example, seeks to disentangle what she sees as classic
"principles of administrative law" (fairness, legality, consistency, rationality,
impartiality) from both a thin account of rule of law, promoted by economic
liberals, and from "values" (such as participation, openness, accountability) that
are formulated largely beyond legal doctrine, and which she understands as
deriving mainly from the "good governance" agenda, or from the due process
rights set out in human rights instruments and jurisprudence.' 45 Koskenniemi's
denunciation of "ersatz normativity" in advocacy of "governance,"
"managerialism," or "legitimacy" is premised on an even stronger view that law
is something irreconcilably different from managerialism and governance." We
acknowledge the force of these positions, but argue that the hybrid governancelaw form is by now an established feature of extra-national regulation and indeed
of national regulation, and it is essential to engage with that reality. Whether this
hybridized form and vocabulary become a conduit for genuine public law, or
conversely escape from all public law values and control through the subliminal
allusions to a legality that has no constitutive presence, remains open for future
struggles. However, the inclusion of a legal dimension in the governance-law
hybrid provides some scope, in our view, for fine-grained application of an
effective future global public law.
The construction of such a global public law may draw both on greater
comparative study of national public law, and greater attention to the practices
of comparison and abstraction in general. The instruments examined here pose
questions about the methodology of comparison between different polities, and
the relation of general or universal norms, or recommendations, to particular
institutional and legal characteristics. The Handbook, for example, stands for a
particular style of this work: a sophisticated tool, informed by a generation of
experience with regulators in a range of developing countries, drawing on
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vocabularies of economics, governance, and law together, and designed both to
promote one model of regulation and to generate recommendations tailored to
the circumstances of particular countries regarding how to move towards this
model. Approaches to a public law of global governance, whether the global
administrative law that emerges in institutions through processes of borrowing
and refinement, or the more doctrinally inspired international public authority,
or the immensely ambitious enterprises of "global constitutionalism," similarly
involve comparative work, whether explicit or not.147 The comparative impulse is
a longstanding feature of conceptions of international law writ large, and
structurally inherent in at least one source of international law, the (only
episodically invoked) "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
The relation of general norms to particular facts is as central to international law
as it is, mutatis mutandis, to any national legal system.
Comparative law plays a salutary role in directing attention back to
specificities and variations between national systems and modes of rule wich
can be lost in a single vocabulary. 148 Concrete experience in particular situations
can thereby be abstracted into more general propositions, which in turn are
given content and context through their local applications and inflections. This
produces an approach to balance the dominant comparativism that has spurred
the diffusion of technologies and ideologies of "newpublic management." As
infrastructure regulatory reform programs are diffused pursuant to international
prescriptions, local institutions such as courts and legislatures may provide fora,
and specific local laws may provide substantive arguments, for challenging the
framing of these programs. Moreover, specific understandings of such terms as
"participation" and "transparency," grounded in national public law, may
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provide an important counterpoint to the delocalized and thus more malleable
vocabulary used in the instruments studied here.
Juxtaposing the intellectual processes of comparison, and of abstraction
and specification, as manifest in the instruments studied here, in the field of
global administrative law, and in international law more broadly, also suggests
the need for more scrutiny of these processes. On what grounds, by what
assumptions or analogies or processes of reasoning, are specific features entailed
by, or enough to satisfy, a norm of "accountability" or "transparency"?" \Vhat
are equivalents, in the drafting of governance instruments, or the elaboration of a
global administrative law, to the processes of interpretation and reasoning with
which we are familiar from doctrinal or adjudicative contexts? The most fruitful
engagement with a putative global public law may be one that recognizes its
current fluidity, seeing it not only as a source of a particular guarantee of
legitimacy or checklist of requirements, but also as a fragmented enterprise in
which these requirements and their foundations are being articulated and
contested. Engagement in the public law dimensions of hard cases, such as
international prescriptions for national infrastructure regulation, is thus a form of
construction; but without clarity or consensus at present on the architecture of
what is being built.
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